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The adoption of the Constitution by the Constitutional Assembly in 1996 he ralded an era of 
hope for South Africa. An era devoid of repression and discord, where, the Constitution and 
not Parliament, r eigns supreme. Concomitantly, South African na tionals - taxpayers al ike - 
were c onferred w ith c onstitutional r ights a nd t he C onstitutional C ourt ( CC) be came a  
vanguard of these rights.  
The c ourt i n Metcash Trading Ltd v CSARS (Metcash1) w as cal led upon to make a 
determination on t he c onstitutionality of  s ections 36, 40( 2) ( a) a nd 40( 5) of  t he V AT A ct. 
Snyders J declared the aforementioned sections of the VAT Act unconstitutional and referred 
the matter to the CC for confirmation. The referral was, in the circumstances, necessary and 
in sync with the provisions of the Constitution. A glimmer of hope for taxpayers attributable 
to the decision of the court in Metcash1, was dashed by a unanimous decision of the CC in 
Metcash where the contentious sections of the VAT Act were declared constitutionally sound 
and the decision of the court a quo was quashed.  
Metcash bears testimony to the fact that South Africa is indeed a constitutional state.  
Metcash was de cided within the cont ext of  t he VAT Act and since i ncome t ax i s di fferent 
from V AT, t here’s w idespread s peculation c oncerning w hat t he c ourt’s decision w ould be  
when c alled upon t o m ake a  de termination on t he c onstitutionality of  t he “pay now , a rgue 
later” rule within the income tax - context. While noble criticisms have been levelled against 
Metcash and by extension to the “pay now, argue later” rule, the reality is, unless Metcash is 
set aside or the legislature intervenes, the “pay now argue later” rule (the rule) is here to stay.  
The t hrust o f t he r esearch was t o es tablish whether t he rule s trikes a b alance be tween two 
inextricably linked and competing interests, to wit, SARS’s paramount duty to efficiently and 
speedily collect and administer tax on t he one hand, and taxpayers’ constitutional r ights on 
the other.  
Taxation constitutes the lifeblood of governments and South Africa is no exception. Since no 
constitutional s tate c an exist w ithout t ax a nd e qually no o rganized s ociety can function 
without tax, it is important for governments to ensure that the tax levied on their respective 





Justification for the rule lies in the fact that: 
 the rule obtains in open and democratic societies;  
 the legislative enactment that forms the substratum of the rule has general application 
in South Africa.  
Contrary to  c riticisms, there is  over whelming e vidence to the effect tha t the  r ule doe s no t 
vitiate taxpayers’ constitutional rights and that many - a - disgruntled - taxpayer whose rights 
have be en m aterially a nd a dversely affected b y t he C ommissioner’s a ctions or  om issions 
pursuant to SARS’s aforementioned duty - have a myriad of remedies at their disposal; inter 
alia; Constitutional, PAJA and other remedies. The only disadvantage being that, since such 
remedies are primarily litigation - based, they are costly and time - consuming.  
More cost-effective remedies for taxpayers such as the establishment of  the Hugh Corder – 
type of  a dministrative tr ibunals a nd the A ustralian ‘merits s ystem’ a re r ecommended. The 
heightening of publ ic awareness concerning the f iscal complaints related - services that the 
Public Protector and the Human Rights Commission render to dissatisfied taxpayers is also 
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“Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things  
  that are God’s.”1
The above Biblical text bears testimony to the fact that the levying of taxes by governments 
on their nationals has been extant for time immemorial. In support of this fact, Croome states 
that: 
 
“[d]uring the reign of the Pharaohs, [n]ilometers were used for purposes of measuring the 
  rise and fall level of the Nile River to determine the rate of tax payable. [A] Stela was used 
 during the reign of Amenemhet III of the Middle Kingdom (1831 BCE) to   mark the level of 
 the Nile. [T]axes were levied according to the height of the   inundation and the amount of 
 land that would be watered and fertilised by it”2
Modern da y governments, a rmed w ith r elevant a nd a pplicable f iscal l egislation, us e t ax 
returns and assessments by f iscal authorities to de termine the quantum of  t ax payable. It i s 
important f or g overnments to ensure tha t the  ta x le vied is c ommensurate w ith the i ncome 
generated by a taxpayer during a given tax period.  
.  
Governments use tax as a tool, inter alia, to:  
“fund the services they deliver3, improve economic growth, regulate levels of employment and 
 budget deficit4 and to enable it to meet its constitutional obligations”5




 means the amount remaining of the gross income of any person for any year or  
period of assessment after deducting therefrom any amounts exempt from normal tax under 
Part I of Chapter II. 
7
                                                          
1Holy Bible, New King James Version (NKJV): Matthew 22:21. 
 means the determination of  the amount of  tax l iability or  refund, by way of  
self-assessment by the taxpayer or assessment by SARS.  
2Croome, BJ. Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa. Claremont: Juta, (2006), 1. (Croome).                                                  
 Croome, B.J. & Olivier, L. Tax Administration. Claremont: Juta, (2010), 1. (Croome & Olivier). 
3Croome, 1. 
4Ibid, 3. 
5Croome & Olivier, 1.  
6S1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (ITA).  





 means t he C ommissioner f or t he S outh A frican R evenue S ervice 
appointed in terms of section 6 of  the SARS Act or the Acting Commissioner designated in 
terms of section 7 of that Act.                                             
Constitution” 9
“stare decisis”
 means The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
10
“judicial review”




 is t he pr ocedure w hereby t he cour t i dentifies and  cur es i llegalities 
committed by the public official concerned. Its purpose is to ensure that the requirements of 
legality are met and that the aggrieved person is afforded a remedy for breach of legality.   
12
“SARS”
 means a form, declaration, document or other manner of submitting information 
to SARS that incorporates a s elf-assessment or is [the] a basis on w hich an assessment is to 
be made by SARS.  
13
“
means the South African Revenue Service established under section 2 of the South 
  African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997. 
SARS Act”14
“tax”
 means the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997.      
15
“tax debt”
 for purposes of administration under this Act, includes a tax, duty, levy, royalty, fee, 
contribution, penalty, interest and any other moneys imposed under a tax Act.  
16
“taxpayer”
 means an amount of t ax due  b y a person in terms of  a t ax Act referred to in 
section 169(1). 
17
                                                          
8Ibid.  
 means-                                                                                                                                                                                                   
(a) a person chargeable to tax;                                                                                                                                                                                    
9S1 (ii) of the Promotion of Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). An Explanatory Memorandum to the Constitution.  
10Ngcukaitobi, T. Precedent, Separation of Powers and the Constitutional Court. 2012 Acta Juridica, 148              
   (Ngcukaitobi). Ex parte Minister for Safety and Security & Others In re: S v Walters and Another 2002 (4) SA  
   613 (CC) para 57. Gcaba v Minister for Safety & Security & Others 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC). 
11Dlamini, CRM. The Administrative Law of a Typical South African University. (LLD Thesis, UWC, 1994),  
   52-53 and139. 
12S30 (c) of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act 39 of 2013 (TALAA). 
13S2 of the SARS Act. 
14Ibid. 
15Ibid. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1992).  
   Blackshield, T. & Williams, G. Australian Constitutional Law and Theory – Commentary and Materials, 3ed.  
   The Federation Press, (2002). Nyambirai v National Social Security Authority & Another 1996 (1) SA 636  
   (ZSC), 643 C-D. Croome, 2.   
16S30 (d) of the TALAA. 
17S151 of the TAA. 
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(b) a representative taxpayer;                                                                                                                                                                          
(c) a withholding agent;                                                                                                                                                                                     
(d) a responsible third party; or                                                                                                                                                                          




 means a tax debt not paid by the day referred to in section 162. 
19
“vendor”
 means the Value – Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (VAT Act).  
20
1.3 EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE LAW THAT CONSTITUTES THE BASIS OF    
 is a person who is, or is required to be, registered for VAT purposes. 
      THE RESEARCH                        
This study entails a restatement or an exposition  of the law as at 16 July 2014 being the 
effective date of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act 39 of 2013 (TALAA) read 
with the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (TAA).  
1.4 THE ORIGIN OF THE “PAY NOW, ARGUE LATER” RULE    
The “ pay now , a rgue l ater” r ule ( the r ule) i s no ne wcomer t o t he S outh A frican T ax Law 
arena. Its origin can be traced back to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (ITA) and the Customs 
and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (CEA)21
The taxpayer’s obligation to pay tax is not suspended by an objection or appeal or pending a 
decision by a court of law – hence the term “pay now, argue later”.  
. 
Kriegler J  in Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
(CSARS) & Another (Metcash) succinctly paraphrased the rule, as follows:                                                                                                        
“In substance, section 36(1) of the Act says that upon assessment by the Commissioner, and 
 notwithstanding the noting of an ‘appeal’, a taxpayer is obliged to pay the assessed tax, 
 called value – added tax plus consequential imposts there and then,…”22
The rationale behind the rule is that the South African government needs revenue to finance 
its expenditure. 
  
                                                          
18S30 (a) of the TALAA. 
19S1 of the VAT Act. 
20Ibid. 
21S9 (1) (b) of the ITA and s 114(1) (a) (ii) of the CEA. S36 of the VAT Act and s 164 of the TAA read  
   with s 58 of the TALAA.   
222001 1 BCLR 1 (CC), para 1.    
4 
 
In similar vein, Croome and Olivier postulate the view that:  
“[n]o constitutional government can exist without tax”23
Prior t o 1994 , South Africa w as a  pa rliamentary state w here p arliament r eigned supreme. 
Provision f or t his w as c ontained i n t he R epublic of  S outh A frica C onstitution A ct 110 o f 
1983 wherein it is stated that:     
.  
“No court of law shall be competent to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of an Act 
of Parliament.”24
A taxpayer could not therefore challenge the f iscal authority in a court of  l aw on the basis 
that the former, in the exercise of its powers, violated his rights. The enactment of the Interim 
Constitution
  
25 and t he s ubsequent a doption by  the C onstitutional A ssembly of  t he 
Constitution26, led to the transformation of the Republic of South Africa from a ‘parliamentary 
state’ to a ‘democratic state’27
The aforementioned unprecedented transformation of South Africa into a constitutional state, 
ushered an era f or t axpayers t o challenge an y fiscal l egislation which prima facie violated 
their procedural and substantive rights.  
.  
The Constitutional C ourt’s l andmark de cision i n Metcash where t he C onstitutional C ourt 
(CC) w as c alled upon t o m ake a  de termination on t he c onstitutionality of  t he r ule be ars 
testimony to South Africa being a true constitutional state.  
1.4.1 BACKGROUND  
SARS’s paramount duty is to ‘administer and collect tax in South Africa’.28  To enable SARS to 
discharge t he abov e-mentioned dut y, t he l egislature c onferred S ARS w ith pow ers t o e ffect 
“the efficient and speedy collection of taxes”29
 
.        
 
 
                                                          
23Croome & Olivier, 3.  
24S34 (3) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983.  
25Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
26Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
27Croome & Olivier, 2. 
28Sections 3 & 4 of the SARS Act.  
29Muller, EA. Framework for Wealth Transfer Taxation in South Africa. (LLD thesis, UP 2010), 63  
  (Muller). 
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Croome & Olivier crystallize this fact further in the following terms:  
“South Africa now has one office, the Commissioner, responsible for the administration of all 
 fiscal statutes in the country.”30
The Commissioner plays a pivotal role in the discharge of SARS’s aforementioned duty by, 
inter alia, issuing an assessment to a taxpayer for a period of assessment under consideration.  
  
The court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v CSARS (FNB) held that SARS is 
subject to the Constitution in the following terms:  
"no matter how indispensable fiscal authority provisions were for the well-being of the   
 country, they were not immune to the discipline of the Constitution and had to conform to 
normative standards.”31
This decision reaffirms the fact that the Commissioner must, in the performance of his duties, 
uphold the values and principles contained in the Constitution. The following are some of the 
basic values and principles:    
  
 promotion and maintenance of a high standard of professionalism; 
 promotion of the efficient, economic and effective use of resources; 
 prompt response to public needs; 
 encouragement of public participation in policy - making; 
 accountability and  
 transparency…32
The Citation of Constitutional Laws Act, 2005(hereafter CCLA) states that:  
 
“no act number must be associated with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa as 
  this act was not passed by Parliament, but was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly.”33
1.4.2 AN OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM      
  
The obligation to pay tax arises when an assessment has been issued. If dissatisfied with an 
assessment, a taxpayer may lodge an objection with the Commissioner and later an appeal if 
the obj ection is di sallowed. The ta xpayer’s ob ligation to pay ta x a nd th e c orresponding 
                                                          
30Croome & Olivier, 9.  
312002 (7) JTLR 250, 252. 
32S195 (1) of the Constitution. 
33S1 of the CCLA.  
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SARS’s pa ramount dut y t o c ollect a nd a dminister t ax i s not  s uspended b y a n obj ection or  
appeal pending a decision by a court of law.  
Relying on  thi s pr ovision dubbed the r ule, the  C ommissioner is  e ntitled to initiate 
proceedings for the recovery of a tax debt by filing a statement with the clerk or registrar of a 
competent court. Such a statement has the effect of a civil judgment for a liquid debt and is 
enforceable against a taxpayer.  
Justification for the rule lies in the following:  
Firstly, taxation is the lifeblood of governments
“… [f]reedom from taxation is not a fundamental right. Not even death.”
. Conradie J in FNB held that: 
34
Support for this view is also made by Henkin, L in the following terms:  
   
“In a literal sense, taxation is, of course, a confiscation of property; equally clearly no 
 organized society can function without it.”35
Croome postulates the view that:  
 
“[w]hile taxpayers’ rights may not be unnecessarily limited the government of the day needs 
  funds to meet specified social objectives imposed on it by the Constitution.36
Secondly, 
” 
a due adjustment must be made and amounts paid in excess refunded with interest 
at the prescribed rate if the  ta xpayer’s a ppeal a pplication is successful f ollowing t he 
disallowance by the Commissioner of a taxpayer’s objection to a disputed assessment.37
Thirdly, 
 
as long as the enabling fiscal legislation satisfies the following prerequisites
 the applicable fiscal legislation must have general application in South Africa; 
, t he 
implementation of the rule by fiscal authorities is appropriate:  
 the implementation of the applicable fiscal legislation must be in the public interest; 
 the implementation of the applicable fiscal legislation must be reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society38
                                                          
34FNB 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 27. 
. 
35Henkin, L. & Rosenthal, AJ. Constitutionalism and Rights – The Influence of the United States  
   Constitution Abroad: Ch5, 125. Columbia University Press, (1999). 
36Croome, 10.  
37S36 (1) of the VAT Act. 
38S36 of the Constitution. 
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Taxpayers are held bent on paying the least amount of tax while fiscal authorities on the other 
hand a re f ocused on  l evying t he m aximum t ax a gainst t axpayers i n or der t o r ealize 
government’s constitutional, economic and socio - economic objectives.                                               
In confirmation of this fact, Croome states that: 
“taxpayers are invariably in an unequal relationship with the fisc in that it compels them to 
  contribute to the state’s coffers. They are not willing participants in the tax system.”39
The inequality of the relationship between SARS and taxpayers is attributed to the rule. This 
relationship of inequality creates tension between taxpayers and fiscal authorities.  
 
Croome makes the following suggestion in relation to harnessing such tension which prima 
facie, poses a potential threat to the South African economy:  
“It is thus essential that tax collection be properly administered to ensure that taxpayers 
comply with the law and meet their obligations. At the same time, the revenue authority 
 should not exceed its powers.”40
In t he e yes of  t axpayers, t he rule constitutes a n unj ustifiable e ncroachment on “their 
procedural and substantive rights such as:                                                                                                                                                       
  
Procedural rights 
• right of access to information; 
                                                                                                                                                               
• right to just administrative action and 
• right of access to courts.41    
• right to property; 
Substantive rights                                                                                                                                                                                          
• right to equality and 
• right to privacy.  
These rights are entrenched in the Bill of Rights.”42
The r ight o f a ccess t o information a nd s ubstantive r ights f all out side the s cope of  t his 
research. 
   
                                                          
39Croome, 14. 
40Croome, 10. 
41Sections 32, 33 & 34 of the Constitution. 
42Chapter 2. The Constitution. Croome, 17 to 265. Croome & Olivier, 21.  
8 
 
The rule is at the core of the tension between taxpayers and revenue authorities. The rule has, 
since its  inception, to date, been the subject of  l itigation and di sputes in the South African 
Tax Law arena notwithstanding Metcash.              
Since Metcash is a decision of the CC, it is, on t he strength of the “stare decisis,”43 binding 
on all courts unless it can be shown that the court has erred.44
The court found the rule to be in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution that were 
in contention. 
  
1.5 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY  
There is overwhelming authority in support of a long established principle in South African 
Tax Law that:   
“[n]o liability for tax arises if there has been no receipt or accrual by the taxpayer.”45
This pr inciple pr esupposes t he g eneration of  i ncome b y a  t axpayer du ring t he pe riod of  
assessment under consideration. Generally, tax collection and administration is a convoluted 
and complex process that has indiscriminate global application.   
                                                                       
Einstein made a similar observation in the following terms:  
“The hardest thing in the world to understand is the income tax.”46
The C ommissioner ha s be en c onferred w ith w ide pow ers unde r di fferent f iscal s tatutes 
pursuant to SARS’s paramount duty. One of these powers is the rule.  
 
Severe c riticisms ha ve been levelled against the  r ule. The ma jor criticism is  tha t the  r ule 
violates t he t axpayers’ above – mentioned c onstitutional r ights. I n or der t o a chieve i ts 
constitutional a nd economic obj ectives a nd to maintain its competitiveness in the g lobal 
economy and f or i ts s ustenance, i t i s i mperative f or t he S outh A frican gove rnment t o l evy 
taxes on its nationals.                
                                                          
43Hahlo, HR. and Kahn, E. The South African Legal System and its Background. Johannesburg: Juta,  
   (1973), 213. Ngcukaitobi, 148. Ex parte Minister for Safety and Security & Others In re: S v Walters and  
   Another 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) para 57. 
44Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1997 (2) SA  
   97 (CC). 
45Williams, RC. Income Tax in South Africa: Law and Practice, 4ed.Durban: Lexis Nexis Butterworths,  
   (2006), 64 (Williams). 
46Ibid, preface of Williams. 
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The focus of  this s tudy will be to determine whether the rule strikes a balance between the 
two inextricably i nterwoven a nd c ompeting i nterests, t o w it, SARS’s paramount dut y t o 
administer and collect tax and the protection of taxpayers’ procedural and substantive rights 
in the event of a disputed assessment.  
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
   1.6.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the study are to: 
 ascertain w hether t he C onstitution pr ovides a dequate pr otection t o t axpayers’ r ights 
vis-à-vis the rule; 
 ascertain the powers afforded to SARS to collect and administer taxes; 
 ascertain whether t he r ule s trikes a ba lance be tween SARS’s pa ramount dut y an d 
taxpayers’ constitutional rights.   
   1.6.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The study will attempt to answer the following questions: 
 Does the Constitution provide protection to taxpayers’ rights vis-à-vis the rule? 
 What i s t he e xtent of  t he pow ers t hat ha ve be en c onferred t o t he C ommissioner 
pursuant to SARS’s paramount duty? 
 Does t he i mposition of  t ax b y t he s tate on t axpayers w ithin t he c ontext of t he r ule 
constitute a violation of taxpayers’ constitutional rights? 
 What ar e t he pr ospects of s uccess f or a t axpayer w ho challenges t he constitutional 
validity of SARS’s powers? 
 Does t he r ule s trike a balance b etween SARS’s pa ramount dut y and  t axpayers’ 
constitutional rights? 
1.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There a re no ethical considerations. Having read t he University’s R esearch Ethics P olicy I 
declare that to the best of my knowledge: 
 the research does not fall into any category that requires special ethical obligations; 





The resources available are sufficient and no additional resources are required for purposes of 
the research.  
1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
No limitations to the research are envisaged. 
1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY    
The research is desk-top based. It will encompass a r eview and a critical analysis of journal 




















                                                              CHAPTER 2 
POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONER 
2.1 POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONER  
The court in FNB47 held that SARS is subject to the Constitution. This therefore means that 
the Commissioner must, in the performance of his duties, exercise his powers within the bounds of 
the law and the Constitution48
 the statement procedure,
. Pursuant t o SARS’s paramount dut y, t he l egislature has, i nter 
alia, conferred the Commissioner with the below mentioned powers: 
49
 the appointment of a third party as a taxpayer’s agent,
 
50
 the “pay now, argue later” rule,
 
51
 the search and seizure procedure,
  
52
 the sequestration, liquidation and winding up procedure.
  
53
A discussion of the search and seizure procedure, the sequestration, liquidation, and winding 
up procedure lies beyond the scope of this research.  
  
To appreciate the import of these intrinsically linked powers, it is necessary to allude to what 
the court stated in CSARS v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd; In re: CSARS v Hawker Aviation 
Services Partnership & Others (Hawker) regarding the exercise of a public power by a public 
authority:  
“The Commissioner is indeed endowed with tremendous powers to collect taxes in the 
  national interests, however, that power must be exercised within the bounds of the law and 
 constitutional imperatives…[I]t is for the courts to maintain a modicum of fairness and 
 justice in curbing the excesses of arbitrary use of public power.”54
The Commissioner’s exercise of  po wers conferred on him by a f iscal s tatute constitutes an 
administrative action
 
55 which i s reviewable under the provisions of the PAJA56
                                                          
472002 (7) JTLR 250,252. 
. The t erm 
48S3 (1) of the ITA. 
49S91(1) (b) of the ITA & s 40(2)(a) of the VAT Act & s172 (1) of the TAA read with s 62(1) & (2) of  
   the TALAA. Metcash Trading Ltd v CSARS 2000 (2) SA 232 (W), 242 (Metcash 1).   
50S99 of the ITA; s47 of the VAT Act and s 179(1) of the TAA read with s66 (1) of the TALAA.  
51S88 (1) (a) and (b) of the ITA; s36 (1) of the VAT Act and s164 (1) (a) & (b) of the TAA.     
52S74D (1) (a) to (c) of the ITA and s 59(1) of the TAA. 
53S65 (1) of the TALAA; s 40(2) (c) of the VAT Act and s 91(1) (c) of the ITA.  
54[2005] 1 All SA 715 (T), para [75]. 
55S33 of the Constitution. Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd v CSARS & Another 2011 ZAWCHC 297 (Capstone).  
56S6 of PAJA. 
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‘administrative a ction’ is de fined i n P AJA.57
The C ommissioner t hen f iled ur gent l iquidation a nd s equestration a pplications a gainst t he 
respondents on the basis that they were unable to or should be deemed to be unable to satisfy 
a tax debt in terms of the Companies Act.
 In Hawker, the C ommissioner ha d i ssued a n 
assessment t o t he r espondents a gainst w hom three w rits of  ex ecution were l ater i ssued in 
favour o f t he C ommissioner a fter t he s uccessful i nstitution of  a n action a gainst t he 
respondents.  
58
The issues for determination by the court were, inter alia: 
  
 whether the two applications were urgent; 
 whether the applications were brought for an ulterior purpose and 
 whether t he j udgment o btained i n t erms of  s ection 40( 2) ( a) of  t he VAT A ct w as 
valid. 
The court dismissed the two applications with costs on these terms:  
“I am not persuaded that the applicant has made out a convincing case for urgency…”59
Hawker 
       
60
2.1.1 THE STATEMENT PROCEDURE 
is a classical illustration of an abuse by the Commissioner of the court process and 
of the fiscal powers conferred on him.  
    2.1.1.1   NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT 











                                                          
57S1 of PAJA. Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v CSARS [2012] ZAGPPHC312, para [30]. 
     
58S345 (1) (b) &(c) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
59Hawker, para [22]. 
60Ibid, para [25]. High Stead Entertainment (Pty) Ltd t/a “The Club” v Minister of Law and Order  
   1994 (1) SA 387 (C), 395A-B and President of the Republic of South Africa & Others v South African 
   Rugby Football Union & Others 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC), para [133].  
61S91of the TAA.  
62 S92 of the TAA & s79 of the ITA. 
63S93 (1) (a); (c) & (d) of the TAA read with s 45(b) of the TALAA. S79A of the ITA and s 31A of the  
   VAT Act. 
64S94 (1) of the TAA. Croome & Olivier, 90 -108.   
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The genesis of  t he s tatement pr ocedure can  be  traced ba ck t o the i ssuance of  a  not ice o f 
assessment65 by the Commissioner on t he taxpayer66. And since a not ice of  assessment is a 
precondition f or t he s tatement pr ocedure,67
The court in ITC 788
 it i s s ubmitted t hat a  di scussion of  a  not ice of  
assessment as a precursor to the statement procedure is appropriate and shall follow hereafter.  
68
The notice of assessment must contain the following: 
 drew a di stinction between an assessment and a notice of assessment 
and he ld t hat t he c orrect pr ocedure i s f or t he C ommissioner t o f irst do a n a ssessment a nd 
thereafter to notify the taxpayer accordingly.  
 the taxpayer’s name; 
 the taxpayer’s reference number or any other form of identification;    
 the date of assessment; 
 the amount of the assessment; 
 the tax period subject to the assessment; 
 the date of payment of the amount assessed; 
 a summary of the procedure for lodging an objection to the assessment69
The purpose of issuing a notice of assessment is to determine the tax due by a taxpayer or a 
refund du e t o a  t axpayer.
.     
70 At the  out set, the Commissioner is sues a n assessment to a 
taxpayer who may lodge an objection thereto if he is dissatisfied.71





 Non-compliance with such timeframes often has dire consequences for a 
dissatisfied taxpayer.  
 
                                                          
65S 96(1) and (2) of the TAA; s77 (3) of the ITA and s 31 of the VAT Act. 
66S77 (3) of the ITA & s31 (1) (a) – (f) & (2) (a) and (b) of the VAT Act.     
67Singh v CSARS 2003 (4) SA 520 (SCA). S96 of the TAA read with s62(1) and (2) of the TALAA and  
   s40 (2) (a) the VAT Act and s 91(1) (b) of the ITA.  
6819 SATC 428. Croome & Olivier, 91; Irvin & Johnson (SA) Ltd v CIR 1946 AD 483 and 
   Stroud Riley & Co. v CIR 1974 (4) SA 534 (E).  
69S96 (1) and (2) of the TAA. 
70SARS Short Guide to the TAA, Chapter 8 at 42 para.8.1. Croome, B.J. “What can you do when SARS delays a  
   Refund”. (2007) Accountancy SA 31.  
71S32 (b) of the VAT Act; s81 (1) of the ITA and s104 (1) of the TAA. 
72S107A and Part IIIA of Chapter III of the ITA and the Rules promulgated thereunder. S104(5) (a) of  
   the TAA and s 32(2) of the VAT Act.  
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In Rossi & Others v CSARS the court stated that:  
“the fiscus should be entitled to assume finality in the collection of tax monies, particularly 
where the Act sets out certain timeframes which cannot be lightly ignored or rendered 
ineffective.”73
Support for this view was made by the court in Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital & Another.
  
74
“[T]he only way in which these assessments can be questioned is in the manner provided for   
 in the Act, namely, by objecting to the respondent in terms of s 81 of the Act and then 
appealing to the Special Court in terms of s 83 of the Act.”
 The 
court in Van Zyl v The Master & Another held that:    
75
2.1.1.2 ONUS OF PROOF       
      
The onus  r ests on t he t axpayer t o pr ove on a  preponderance of  p robabilities76 that he  is  
exempt f rom or  not  liable to any tax chargeable77. A  f urther onus  r ests o n the t axpayer t o 
prove that he did not receive an assessment.78
2.1.1.3 OBJECTION TO A DISPUTED ASSESSMENT  
  
The Commissioner may, on receipt of an objection to an assessment, alter the assessment in 
whole or  i n p art o r disallow t he obj ection.79The t axpayer must b e a dvised of  t he 
Commissioner’s decision.80 The Commissioner must state the basis of his decision.81
The Commissioner is obliged to furnish a taxpayer with adequate reasons in writing for the 
administrative a ction taken.
 
82 The S upreme C ourt of  A ppeal w as called upon t o m ake a 
determination on, i nter alia, t he a dequacy of  t he r easons for a  t ax a ssessment i n CSARS v 
Sprigg Investment 117 CC t/a Global Investment 83
                                                          
73[2011] ZAGPJHC 16 para [1]. S100 (1) (a) to (g) of the TAA; s 32(5) of the VAT Act and s 81(5) of  
(Sprigg). 
   the ITA.    
74[2007] ZACC 24 
751991(1) SA 874 (ECD), 877G.  
76CIR v Goodrick 12 SATC 279; Reliance Land & Investment BC (Pty) Ltd v CIR 14 SATC 47;                                                   
   CIR v SA Mutual Unit Trust Management Co. Ltd 1990 (4) SA 529 (A), 538D. Goldswain, G.K. The  
   application and constitutionality of the so - called “reverse” onus of proof provisions and  
   presumptions in the Income Tax Act: the revenue’s unfair advantage. (2009) 2 Meditari Accountancy  
   Research 61, 69 para 7.1.  
77S37 of the VAT Act. S102 (1) (a) to (f) of the TAA and s 82(a) to (c) of the ITA. 
78S106 (3) of the ITA. Singh v CSARS 2003(4) SA 520 (SCA).              
79S32 (4) of the VAT Act; s 81(4) of the ITA and s106 (2) of the TAA. 
80Ibid. 
81S106 (5) of the TAA. 
82S5 (2) of PAJA. 
83[2010] ZASCA 172. 
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The de cision of  t he c ourt i n Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism v Phambili 
Fisheries (Pty) Ltd (Phambili) wherein what constitutes ‘adequate reasons’ was endorsed - 
was approvingly cited in Sprigg as follows: 
“[T]he decision maker must explain his position in a way which will enable an aggrieved 
 person to say, in effect: ‘even though I may not agree with it, I now understand why the 
decision went against me. I am now in a position to decide whether that decision has involved 
an unwarranted finding of fact, or an error of law, which is worth challenging.”84
In CSARS v Pretoria East Motors (Pty) Ltd the court stated that the raising of an additional 
assessment must be based on proper grounds. 
  
The court held further that:  
“It is only in this way that SARS can engage the taxpayer in an administratively fair 
 manner, as it is obliged to do. It is also the only basis upon which it can, as it must, provide 
grounds for raising the assessment to which the taxpayer must then respond by demonstrating 
that the assessment is wrong.”85
The court set aside the taxpayer’s income tax assessments for the 2000 to 2002 tax years and 
the t axpayer’s a dditional V AT a ssessments f or t he 2000 t o 2004 t ax years be cause S ARS 
could not provide proper grounds for raising such assessments.  
 
The dispute concerning the aforementioned tax years was remitted to SARS for reassessment. 
This de cision hi ghlights t he i mportance o f f urnishing t he t axpayer with proper grounds or  
adequate reasons for raising assessments. The Commissioner’s decision - where no objection 
has be en l odged o r w here a ny obj ection t o a  disputed a ssessment ha s be en di sallowed, 
withdrawn or al tered as the case may be - is final and conclusive.86 A dissatisfied taxpayer 
may lodge an appeal with the Tax Court against the Commissioner’s decision87
2.1.1.4 FILING OF A STATEMENT AT COURT        
.  
Where t he t axpayer fails t o pa y any t ax or  i nterest t hereon w hen i t i s due  or  pa yable, t he 
Commissioner may file a statement with the clerk or registrar of any competent court.88
                                                          
842003 (6) SA 407 (SCA), para [40]. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd & Another v  
   
  Wraith & Others (1983) 48 ALR 500 at 507. Re Palmer and Minister for the Capital Territory (1978) 23 ALR 
   196 at 206 -7. Nkondo & Gumede v Minister of Law & Order 1986 (2) SA 756(A) at 772I – 773I.     
85[2014] ZASCA 91, para [11]. 
86S32 (5) of the VAT Act. S81 (5) of the ITA and s 107 (4) of the TAA.    
87S33 (1) of the VAT Act. S107 (1) of the TAA and s 83 (1) of the ITA. 
88S40 (2) (a) of the VAT Act. S91(1) (b) of the ITA and s 172(1) and (2) of the TAA read with s 62(1) of  
   the TALAA.  
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The purpose of  f iling a statement at court i s to recover the tax due or  interest thereon. The 
ITA, t he T AA and t he VAT A ct do not  pr ovide f or pr ior not ice t o t he t axpayer ere t he 
commencement of  t he s tatement procedure. On t he cont rary, the T ax Administration Laws 
Amendment A ct 39 of  2013 ( TALAA) s tipulates t hat t he s tatement pr ocedure m ay be  
initiated by SARS after at least 10 business days’ notice to the taxpayer.89 However, SARS 
may di spense w ith such not ice if  s atisfied that the c ollection of  t ax w ould be  pr ejudiced 
thereby.90 
 it may be filed with the clerk or registrar of any competent court; 
The following are attributes of a statement:                                                                                              
 the court must have jurisdiction over the taxpayer named in the statement;91
 it must set forth the tax debt or interest due or payable by a taxpayer; 
 
 it must be certified by the Commissioner as correct; 
 it shall thereupon have all the effects of 92and must be treated as a civil judgment 
lawfully given i n t he r elevant c ourt i n f avour of  S ARS f or a  l iquid de bt of  t he 
amount specified therein.93
SARS is  e mpowered to amend the s tatement f iled with the c lerk or r egistrar if  the 
Commissioner is of the opinion that the amount of the tax debt amplified in the statement is 
incorrect.
                                            
94
The TAA further stipulates that an amended statement is ineffective until it has been initialled 
by the clerk or registrar of the court concerned.
  
95
SARS is further empowered to withdraw a statement on the basis of the incorrectness of the 
tax debt reflected therein by forwarding a notice to the relevant clerk or registrar of the court 
and to file a new statement in terms of s 172(1).
    
96
Croome & Olivier 
   
97
                                                          
89S62 (1) of the TALAA. 
correctly pos tulate the  vi ew tha t the  f iling of  a  s tatement a t c ourt 
constitutes the deprivation of a taxpayer’s property. Many dissatisfied taxpayers have, as will 
become apparent in the ensuing discussion, questioned the constitutional validity of the fiscal 
statutes that form the basis of the statement procedure. 
90S172 (3) of the TAA.  
91S173 of the TAA. S40 (3) of the VAT Act and s 91 (2) of the ITA. Mokoena v CSARS 2011 (2) SA 556(GSJ).  
92S40 (2) (a) of the VAT Act and s 91(1) (b) of the ITA. 
93S174 of the TAA. 
94S175 (1) of the TAA read with s63 of the TALAA. 
95S175 (2) of the TAA.  
96S176 (1) & (2) of the TAA read with ss 62 (1) and (2) and 64 (a) of the TALAA.  
97Croome & Olivier, 229. 
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It appears f rom t he m ere r eading of  t he p rovisions of  t he e nabling fiscal s tatutes t hat t he 
following formalities must be met before the commencement of the statement procedure: 
 the taxpayer must have been afforded time within which to pay the tax due; 
 the period within which the tax due should be paid must have expired; 
 the taxpayer must have failed or refused to pay the tax due; 
 SARS m ust ha ve de manded pa yment of  t he t ax due  f rom t he t axpayer t o no 
avail.98
In Mokoena v CSARS
 
99
 the taxpayer had noted an objection to the assessment and such objection had not 
been finalized by the Commissioner when the latter filed a statement at court. 
 (Mokoena) the taxpayer’s application for the rescission of judgment 
granted in terms of s 91(1) (b) of the ITA was successful on the following grounds: 
 the taxpayer was not  aware of the judgment unt il when he  approached Nedbank 
for a mortgage bond application and a credit check revealed this fact.        
The court in Mokoena held that in the aforementioned circumstances, rescission is competent. 
In s upport of  i ts de cision, t he c ourt a pprovingly c ited Kruger v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue100 and Metcash.101
In Kruger v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 
                                      
102
The a pplicants i n Motsepe v CIR
(Kruger) the taxpayer declined to pay the 
tax due  to SARS and interest amplified on the a ssessments on the b asis that the  s tatement 
procedure in terms of s 91(1) (b) of the ITA was invalid and that the inclusion by SARS of 
additional i nterest w as i llegal. J ansen J A who d elivered a  unanimous d ecision of  t he court 
held that the inclusion of interest in the statement procedure was valid. The court accordingly 
dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.  
103
 
 launched an uns uccessful challenge a gainst t he 
constitutional validity of sections 91(1) (b); 92 and 94 of the ITA.  
                                                          
98Ibid. S40 (2) (a) of the VAT Act; s62 (1) of the TALAA and s91 (1) (b) of the ITA.  
992011 (2) SA 556 (GSJ). See also Chetty v Law Society, Transvaal 1985 (2) SA 756 (A). De Wet & Others v  
   Western Bank Ltd 1979 (2) SA 1031(A). PE Bosman Transport Committee & Others v Piet Bosman Transport   
   (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 794(A). Smith NO v Brummer NO & Another 1954 (3) SA 352 (O).  
1001966 (1) SA 457 (C), 462A. 
1012001 1 BCLR 1 (CC), paras [65] and [66]. 
1021973 (1) SA 394 (A). 
1031997 (2) SA 897 (CC). 
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In dismissing the application, the court held that: 
“it was unnecessary to decide on the constitutionality of the aforementioned sections because 
 the taxpayers have failed to exhaust the objection and appeal procedures provided for in the 
Act.”104
Furthermore, the court held that: 
  
“the constitutionality of s 91(1) (b) of the ITA was not raised in the court a quo nor did the 
 court a quo refer the matter to the CC for determination.”105
The cour t a quo referred onl y s ections 92 a nd 94 of  t he ITA t o t he C C a nd t here w as n o 
formal a pplication f or direct a ccess a s r equired b y t he C onstitution
  
106nor w as s uch a n 
application made from the bar.107
In r esponse t o t he C ommissioner’s pr ayer f or c osts i ncluding c osts attendant upon t he 
employment of three counsels, the court made the following remarks:  
  
“In my view one should be cautions in awarding costs against litigants who seek to enforce 
 their constitutional right against the state, particularly where the constitutionality of a 
 statutory provision is attacked, lest such orders have an unduly inhibiting or ‘chilling’ effect 
on other potential litigants in this category. This cautious approach cannot, however, be 
allowed to develop into an inflexible rule so that litigants are induced into believing that they 
are free to challenge the constitutionality of statutory provisions in this court, no matter how 
spurious the grounds for doing so may be or how remote the possibility that this court will 
grant them access…”108
Since s 40(2) (a) of the VAT Act is couched in terms similar to s 91(1) (b) of the ITA, it is 
prudent to discuss the various decisions of the courts on s 40(2) (a) of the VAT Act.  
    
The constitutional validity of s 40 of the VAT Act was raised in Traco Marketing (Pty) Ltd 
and Another v The Minister of Finance and Others 109
Counsel f or t he appellants submitted t hat t he s aid s ection w as unc onstitutional a nd t hus 
invalid for it w as inconsistent with the Bill of  Rights, inter alia, the r ight to administrative 
justice, human dignity, equality and access to courts.  
(Traco).  
                                                          
104Ibid, para [21]. 
105Ibid, para [24]. 
106S167 (6) (a) of the Constitution read with Rule 18 (1) to (5) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court.  
    (Government Gazette No.25726). 
107Motsepe, para [25]. 
108Ibid, para [30]. 
1091998 (4) SA 1002(SE). 
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The court held that an objection against an assessment does not postpone the payment of tax 
reflected as owing. Leave was granted to the Commissioner to refer the matter to the CC to 
make a determination on the constitutional validity of s40 of the VAT Act. The constitutional 
validity of s40 of the VAT Act remained unresolved as a result of the CC’s denial of direct 
access110
Croome & Olivier made the following comments in support of the statement procedure: 
 to the Commissioner.  
“It is unlikely that a court will find that the provisions contained in s 91(1) (b) of the Act and 
 the VAT equivalents are invalid on constitutional grounds. The Commissioner is charged 
with administering the fiscal statutes of South Africa and it must be entitled to enforce the 
collection and recovery of assessed taxes due to it in order to ensure that the state recovers 
funds due to it to meet its constitutional obligations. It would appear that the filing of 
statements in court is found in other open and democratic societies and a taxpayer will be 
hard pressed to show that the provisions are unreasonable and unjustifiable in a democratic 
society. The provisions found in s 91(1) (b) of the Act and s 40 of the VAT Act are similar to 
those contained in the tax statutes of other democracies…”111
The trial court in Metcash Trading Ltd v CSARS
     
112 (Metcash1) was called upon to make a 
determination on t he c onstitutionality of  s ections 36, 40( 2) a) a nd 40( 5) of  t he V AT A ct. 
Snyders J  de clared t he aforementioned s ections of t he V AT A ct i nvalid113and referred the 
matter to the CC for confirmation.114
The r eferral w as, in the ci rcumstances, necessary and in s ync with t he pr ovisions of  t he 
Constitution.
  
115 A glimmer of hope for taxpayers attributable to the decision of the court in 
Metcash1 was dashed by a unanimous decision of the CC in Metcash where the contentious 
sections of the VAT Act were declared constitutionally sound and the decision of the court a 
quo was set aside.116
                                                          
110S167 (6) (a) of the Constitution read with Rule 18 (1) to (5) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court  
    
    (Government Gazette No. 25726). 
111Croome & Olivier, 232. 
1122000 (2) SA 232 (W). 
113Ibid, 330. 
114S167 (5) of the Constitution. 
115S172 (2) (a) of the Constitution.  
116Metcash, para [74]. 
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The c ourt i n Singh v CSAR 117
That the provisions of the VAT Act are mandatory insofar as the giving of written notice of 
assessment
(Singh) was c alled upon t o  m ake a  de termination on t he 
validity of  a s tatement p rocedure f iled i n t erms of s  40  (2) ( a) o f t he V AT A ct where t he 
taxpayer was not given a notice of assessment.  
118
The court made the following remarks:  
 to the ta xpayer b y th e C ommissioner is  concerned, is cr ystal cl ear. It w as 
common cause that the taxpayer was not served with a notice of assessment.                                                                    
“[I]n the absence of a notice of assessment an amount which is not due cannot be payable. 
 No such notice had been given in this case. It follows that it was not open to the 
Commissioner to utilize the procedures of s 40.”119
It was further correctly stated that: 
  
“the primary purpose of giving notice of the assessment is not objection and appeal but 
 payment by the taxpayer.”120
The court in Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank & Another 
  
121
The court a quo he ld that s  38(2) of the Act was inconsistent with s 34 of  the Constitution. 
Counsel f or t he r espondents cited Hindry v Nedcor Bank Ltd & Another 
(Lesapo) was called upon, 
pursuant to s 172 (2) (a) of the Constitution, to confirm an order invalidating section 38(2) of 
the N orth W est A gricultural B ank A ct 14  of  19 81(the A ct) which pe rmits t he N orth W est 
Agricultural Bank to seize a  defaulting debtor’s assets without recourse to court and to sell 
such property at an auction to defray the debt owed to it. 
122
The respondents’ counsel further submitted that the purpose of the impugned section was to 
provide a  qui ck, e ffective a nd i nexpensive pr ocedure t hat enables the B ank t o p rotect 
whatever real rights it has in the secured property. 
(Hindry) a s 
authority and justification for the respondents’ actions to resort to a measure of self-help.  
 
                                                          
1172003 (4) SA 520 (SCA). 
118S31 (4) of the VAT Act. 
119Singh, para [12]. 
120Ibid, paras [17] & [22]. 
121[1999] ZACC16.   
1221999 (2) SA 757 (W). 
21 
 
To t his e nd, t he r espondents a rgued t hat t he i nfringement of  s  34 of  t he C onstitution w as 
justified. The court held that there are other less invasive remedies which are available to the 
Bank to realise its purpose. Such means do not prejudice debtors to the extent that the s 38(2) 
procedure does.  
The court held further that: 
“[I]n appropriate circumstances an interdict against the alienation of the goods could be 
 obtained on an urgent basis.”123
The c ourt he ld t hat Hindry was di stinguishable from Lesapo in that the for mer dealt w ith 
provisions of a fiscal statute and furthermore, the court held that it had not been called upon 
to make a determination on the correctness or otherwise of Hindry.  
  
The court’s decision was succinctly put by Olivier in the following terms: 
“The court struck down the provision as unconstitutional as it infringed upon the right of 
  access to court and breached the rule of law by sanctioning self - help: the bank was 
 permitted to be a judge in its own cause.”124
2.1.2 THE APPOINTMENT OF A THIRD PARTY AS A TAXPAYER’S AGENT 
     





The primary purpose of the power is, according to Croome & Olivier, to enforce and ensure 
that assessed tax is paid by taxpayers
 correctly state that the aforementioned power forms the substratum of 
the Commissioner’s directive to financial institutions to pay over any funds in the taxpayer’s 
bank account to liquidate the tax debts due by the taxpayer to SARS.  
127
                                                          
123Ibid, para [27]. 
. The fact that the  Commissioner, armed with this 
power, directs a pension fund, provident fund or retirement annuity fund to use all or part of a 
lump s um or  a nnuity t o a  t axpayer i n s ettlement of  t ax due  t o t he C ommissioner be ars 
testimony t o t he s cope and w idth of  t he C ommissioner’s pow ers. It i s s ubmitted t hat s uch 
powers must be used sparingly.   
124Olivier, L. Tax collection and the Bill of Rights. 2001 TSAR 193,198. First National Bank of SA Ltd v  
    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa; Sheard v Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa  
    2000 (3) SA 626 (CC).  
125S99 of the ITA; s179 (1) the TAA read with s 66(1) of the TALAA and s47 of the VAT Act.  




In Hunting Industries Ltd v Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe & Others128
Croome & Olivier correctly opined that:  
 the court left open the 
question w hether t he Zimbabwean R evenue A uthority m ay a uthorise a  bank t o i ncrease a 
taxpayer’s overdraft to the limit of such facility in order to effect payment of overdue tax to 
the fiscal authority. 
“it is unlikely that a South African court would authorise a bank to increase the taxpayer’s 
  overdraft to settle tax reflected as owing to SARS as the bank does not, in fact, have funds 
 belonging to the taxpayer as required under s 99 of the ITA when the taxpayer’s bank  
account is in overdraft.”129
Croome & Olivier further and correctly postulate the view that:                                                                                               
 
“in practice the Commissioner resorts to these extreme measures only where the taxpayer has 
 failed to respond to written or telephonic demands for payment”130
In Hindry
.       
131
“As you appreciate I must continue with procedures to recover the amounts involved.”
 the court was called upon t o make a determination on t he constitutionality of s 
99 of  the ITA. The Commissioner in this matter had, in terms of  paragraph 28(1)(a) of  the 
Fourth Schedule to the ITA, made an erroneous refund to the taxpayer during 1988 and 1990 
respectively, in relation to the assessment of  the 1987 a nd 1989 t ax years. On discovery of  
this f act, correspondence ens ued between Sauermann, a ch artered accountant i n the 
Commissioner’s employ, and the t axpayer’s accountants concerning the repayment of such 
erroneous refund. Sauermann further advised the taxpayer’s accountants in a letter dated 13 
February 1997 as follows: 
132
The taxpayer’s attorneys raised prescription against the Commissioner’s claim and also that 
the taxpayer had lodged an objection to the assessment and that the Commissioner’s decision 
was still pending.  
 
To this end the Commissioner issued the s 99 of the ITA - notice to the taxpayer’s bankers to 
“immediately pay or as and when funds become available”133
                                                          
12868 SATC 91. 
 the amount amplified in the notice.  
129Croome & Olivier, 233. 
130Ibid, 232. 





The taxpayer launched an urgent application to interdict the taxpayer’s bankers from making 
payment to the Commissioner pursuant to the notice and as a final relief the taxpayer sought 
an order setting aside the s 99 of the ITA - notice on the basis of it being inconsistent with the 
Constitution.   
The taxpayer’s counsel made the following submissions: 
 that the Commissioner is, in terms of the s 99 notice empowered to appoint a third 
party as an agent of the taxpayer and to require such agent to make payment of any 
tax due.  The Commissioner in this case made the appointment to recover funds 
allegedly made in error.  
Implicit in this submission is that the appointment was contrary to the empowering 
fiscal provision and thus invalid.            
 the s 99 notice is inconsistent with the Constitution in that it:  
“makes no provision for notice to the taxpayer or representations by him before it 
 becomes operative; is totally outside the context of the court or any independent or  
impartial tribunal or forum; infringes a taxpayer’s right to privacy, the right to just 
administrative action and the right of access to courts.”134
Counsel for the respondents argued that: 
 
“the Commissioner’s claim is for a repayment under paragraph 28(7) of the Fourth Schedule 
 to the ITA of a refund that was incorrectly authorised by him under paragraph 28(1) (a) of 
the Fourth Schedule…”135
The court dispensed with the taxpayer’s administrative injustice and prescription challenges 
by s tating that paragraph 28(7) of  the Fourth Schedule provides an answer to the argument 
that “any tax due” did not include any erroneous refund.  
  
Furthermore, the c ourt di d not  m ake a ny de termination c oncerning t he pr escription of  t he 
claim because counsel for the taxpayer did not address this matter in the founding affidavit.  
The c ourt s tated f urther tha t the re w as jus tification for the  m anner in which the 
Commissioner had acted in that – 





“[T]he claim was the subject of considerable correspondence and the Commissioner 
 explained how his claim was arrived at and its basis and gave the applicant the opportunity 
to pay it. The audi alteram partem principle may in appropriate cases be satisfied by a party 
being heard after an adverse decision is taken”.136
The court found that the purpose for which a person’s rights are circumscribed by s 99 is:     
 
“to facilitate and enhance his ability to recover promptly taxes which are due and to avoid 
 assets of taxpayers being put beyond his reach and, having regard to the need to speed up the 
collection of taxes and to prevent the frustration of the Commissioner’s efforts and steps to 
that end, the weapon is of great importance to the State. There is no suggestion of equally 
effective methods which could be used in the circumstances to achieve the desired needs”137
The court further held that any limitation of constitutional rights implicit in s 99 of the ITA is 
reasonable and necessary in an open and democratic society.  
. 
The court held that the s 99 notice is a justified measure for the collection of amounts due to 
the fiscus and is consistent with the Constitution.  
The C ommissioner i s n ot obl iged t o g ive pr ior not ice t o t he taxpayer of  t he s  99 no tice. 
Croome & Olivier state that: 
“The reason for this is that the taxpayer could dissipate the assets in an attempt to frustrate 
  the revenue authority’s attempt to enforce the collection of the tax debt.”138
Brett A J e choed the s ame s entiments in Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd & Others v 
CSARS & Others (Support Services) in the following terms:  
  
“I agree with Mr. du Toit that to require a prior hearing would defeat the very purpose of the 
notice. It would alert the defaulting VAT payer to the intention to require payment from the 
latter’s debtor and so enable the defaulting taxpayer to receive payment of the funds due and 
to enable the taxpayer to spirit such funds away. Where prior notice and a hearing would 
render the proposed act nugatory, no such prior notice or hearing is required.”139
                                                          
136Ibid, 49. Administrator, Transvaal & Others v Traub & Others 1989 (4) SA 731(A), 748G-I & 750  
     
    B-F. Cabinet for the Territory of South West Africa v Chikane & Another 1989 (1) SA 349 (A),379 
    F-G and Administrator Transvaal & Others v Zenzile & Others 1991(1) SA 21 (A). Semenya &  
    Others v CCMA & Others (2006) 27 ILJ 1627 (LAC). Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 AD 9, 22.  
    Momoniat v Minister of Law & Order & Others 1986 (2) SA 265 (W), 274D.  
    Baxter, L. Administrative Law. Cape Town: Juta, (1984), 588. 
137Hindry, 63.  
138Croome & Olivier, 235.  
139[1999] 3 All SA 689 (W), 703.  
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In the aforementioned judgment, the court was called upon to set aside an earlier appointment 
of the applicants’ bank as an agent for the applicants in terms of s 47 of the VAT Act and to 
declare the p rovisions of  s 47 of  the VAT Act unconstitutional in t erms of  s  172(1) of  the 
Constitution.  
It was contended on be half of  the applicants that s ince the bank’s appointment as an agent 
took place before assessments were issued, the issue of the s 47 notice was ultra vires.  
To this end the court held that:                                                                                                               
“I do not consider that the decision to issue the notices in terms of s 47 was inextricably 
linked with the assessments made. As previously stated in this judgment the liability to pay 
VAT in terms of s 28(1) of the VAT Act is based upon a self-assessment. I agree with Mr. du 
Toit that the obligation to pay VAT exists independently of any assessment”140
The applicants made a further submission that the s 47 notices should be set aside because the 
amounts of VAT referred to as payable therein are in dispute. In quashing this submission the 
court held that:                                          
.             
“section 36(1) of the VAT Act specifically provides that the obligation to pay and recover 
VAT under the VAT Act is not suspended by any appeal or pending the decision of a court of 
law.”141
The c ourt a pprovingly cited Traco
                                                                           
142
The court in Shaikh v Standard Bank South Africa Ltd & Another
in s upport of  i ts de cision. A ccordingly, t he c ourt 
dismissed the applicants’ application.  
143
The ve ndor challenged the not ice a nd s ubsequent pa yment b y t he ba nk pur suant t o s uch 
notice on the basis that the notice was deficient.  
 made a determination to 
the effect that payment of funds to SARS by an agent of the taxpayer pursuant to a deficient 
notice was valid. In this matter, SARS, relying on s 114 A of the CEA, issued a notice to the 
bank for the payment of VAT due from a vendor. The bank complied with the notice.  
S114A of the CEA is couched in terms similar to s 99 of  the ITA and s 47 of the VAT Act. 
The court dismissed the application on the basis that the CEA made provision for such notice 
as well.  
                                                          
140Ibid, 704. 
141Ibid. 
1421998 (4) SA 74 (SE), 86G-J. 
1432008 (2) SA 622(SCA).  
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Reference was made to Howick District Landowners Association v Umngeni Municipality144
In Goldblatt & Others v Liebenberg & Another
 
in support of the court’s decision.                                                                                                                                                                                 
145
In t his c ase, t he court di smissed t he a pplication on t he ba sis t hat s  9 9 not ice i ssued t o 
Liebenberg’s em ployer was de ficient be cause t here w as no prior as sessment i ssued to 
Liebenberg. 
, t he c ourt w as c alled upon t o m ake a 
determination on, inter alia, the manner in which the s 99 notice that was in contention in the 
matter, had been obtained. 
The c ourt in Pestana v Nedbank Ltd146
In Mpande Foodliner CC v CSARS & Others 
cautioned against t he abus e of  t ax col lection and 
enforcement m echanisms. In this c ase, the court m ade i t cr ystal cl ear t hat t he s  99 notice 
should be used solely for the collection of tax due by a taxpayer and for no other purpose.     
147
The issues to be decided upon were, inter alia,                                                                                                        
(a) whether the applicant was part of a tax avoidance scheme?                                                              
(b) what is the ambit of s 47 of the VAT Act?                                                                                       
(c) whether the Commissioner had applied his mind when issuing the s 47 notice?                                                                                                              
(d) whether the applicant was entitled to a hearing before the s 47 notice was issued?    
(Mpande) - the applicant made an application 
for t he re versal o f t he Commissioner’s conclusion to a ppoint t he M pumalanga P rovincial 
Government as the applicant’s agent in terms of s 47 of the VAT Act.   
After careful c onsideration of  t he s ubstance and c ircumstances s urrounding t he c ession of  
Tivotonkhe (Pty) Ltd’s business to the applicant, the court came to a conclusion that:          
“the transaction between Tivotonkhe and the applicant was lawfully concluded at arm’s 
length and that there was nothing untoward in transferring the feeding scheme by means of a 
cession”.148
The court held that the Commissioner did not apply his mind objectively to the substance and 
circumstances s urrounding t he t ransaction a nd t hat t here was no j ustification f or t he 
Commissioner’s decision that there was indeed a tax avoidance scheme.  
         
                                                          
1442007 (1) SA 206 (SCA). 
14571 SATC 189. Croome & Olivier, 238. 
14671 SATC 1.  
147[2000] JOL 7545 (T). 
148Ibid, para [24]. Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 24 SATC 705.  
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The ot her r emaining is sues w ill be  de alt w ith simultaneously. The court r etorted that the  
appointment of an agent must be reasonably necessary. 
The court highlighted the following jurisdictional facts that are not only vital in invoking s 47 
of the VAT Act but that each such fact must be present and objectively determined before the 
Commissioner is competent to issue the s 47 notice: 
“one, it must be reasonably necessary to declare a person an agent of the taxpaying vendor; 
 two, who can only be declared an errant or recalcitrant taxpayer if an amount of tax, 
additional tax, penalty or interest is due and payable; three, only if the agent is required to 
make payments of such monies held by him or her for or due to the taxpaying vendor; and 
fourthly, only declare the person as an agent if he, she or it is the taxpaying vendor’s 
debtor.”149
The court held that there was no VAT liability which was due and payable by the applicant to 
the C ommissioner. T he C ourt he ld f urther t hat i t w as not  r easonably necessary f or t he 
Commissioner to invoke s 47 t hereby declaring the Mpumalanga Provincial Government as 
an agent of the applicant as the aforementioned requisite jurisdictional facts were not present. 
  
The court found that the Commissioner usurped fiscal powers bestowed upon him when he 
issued the s 47 notice.  
The court further stated that: 
“powers conferred on a public body for a particular purpose cannot be used for an ulterior 
 purpose”.150
In dealing with the question whether the applicant was entitled to a hearing before the s 47 
notice was issued?- 
  
The court held that the question raises two fundamental questions, namely: 
 firstly, when should the audi alteram principle be applied?  
 secondly, can the principle be whittled away in the light of the Constitution?  
In dismissing counsel for the Commissioner’s submission which was predicated on  Hindry, 
the c ourt s tated that Hindry was distinguishable f rom Mpande in that Hindry dealt w ith a 
different fiscal statute and that circumstances were different. 
                                                          
149Ibid, para [33]. 
150Ibid, para [35]. Van Eck NO & Van Rensburg NO v Etna Stores 1947 (2) SA 984(A), 996-7.   
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The court he ld further t hat i n t he l ight of  t he C onstitution which i s supreme, Hindry is no  
authority for the appointment of a third party as an agent of a taxpayer. The court further held 
that the Commissioner’s action was not only unlawful but that it was null and void in that the 
denial of  t he a udi alteram pa rtem pr inciple t o t he t axpayer be fore t he i ssuing of  the s 47  
notice by the Commissioner constitutes an infringement of s 33(1) of the Constitution.  
Counsel for the respondent cited Support Services as authority for the submission that a prior 
hearing is not a prerequisite for the issuance of the s 47 notice and that a prior hearing would 
defeat the very purpose of the notice.  
The court respectfully expressed disagreement with Brett AJ’s decision in Support Services in 
the following terms:  
“Section 33(1) constitutionalises the ancient rules of natural justice: audi alteram partem and 
nemo iudex in sua causa by adding a dynamic third dimension: the duty to act fairly …151 
 Secondly, given the paramountcy and potency of the Bill of Rights, section 47 of the VAT Act 
 must indeed yield to section 33(1) of the Constitution.152
In my view, therefore the right to a hearing encapsulated in the audi principle cannot be 




In conclusion, t he c ourt he ld t hat on t he f acts o f t he c ase, t he a pplicant s hould ha ve be en 
afforded a he aring pr ior t o t he i ssuing of  the s 47 not ice. T he c ourt s et a side t he 
Commissioner’s appointment of the Mpumalanga Provincial Government as an agent of the 
applicant on the basis of being unlawful, null and void and deficient of the requirement to act 
reasonably and fairly. In Smartphone SP (Pty) Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd & Another
  
154
The gravamen of the applicant’s case was twofold, namely:  
 an urgent 
application was brought by the applicant for an order declaring as unlawful the appointment 
in terms of s 47 of the VAT Act of ABSA Bank as an agent of the applicant and the reversal 
of payment made in favour of SARS by ABSA Bank pursuant to such appointment.  
 firstly, that it had not been issued with an assessment in terms of s 31(4) of the VAT 
Act and 
                                                          
151Mpande, para [43]. 
152Ibid, para [46]. 
153Ibid, para [44]. 
154[2003] JOL 12349(W). 
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 secondly, t he a pplicant averred t hat i t w as not  afforded a  p rior he aring be fore t he 
issuing of the s 47 notice.  
Relying heavily on t he judgment of  the SCA in Singh and also on Mpande, the applicant’s 
counsel a rgued t hat t he ne cessary j urisdictional pr erequisite f or S ARS’s a ppointment of  
ABSA Bank as an agent of  t he appl icant w as l acking an d t hat s uch a ppointment a nd 
consequent payment to SARS effected pursuant to the s 47 notice was unlawful and fell to be 
set aside.  
On a closer scrutiny of s47, the court stated that:  
“s 47 permits the Commissioner to appoint an agent for a taxpayer for purposes of paying tax 
and that s 47 is not an aid to determining liability, it merely provides SARS with a mechanism 
to obtain payment”155
Reference was made with approval to Industrial Manpower Projects (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of 
Revenue, Vereeniging & Others
.  
156
Turning to whether the Commissioner was obliged to afford applicant a prior hearing ere the 
issuing of the s 47 not ice, the court briefly referred to the controversy in the South Gauteng 
High Court created by the decisions of Patel AJ in Mpande and Brett AJ  in Support Services. 
The court expressed support and preference for Brett AJ’s decision.  
 where the same sentiments were echoed by the court. The 
court s tated that Singh’s case is  di stinguishable from Smartphone and cannot t herefore be  
relied upon by the applicant with success.  
The court cited National Educare Forum v CSARS157
In t he f inal a nalysis, t he c ourt f ound t hat S ARS di d i n f act effect service of  a not ice of  
assessment on the applicant’s predecessor and to that end; the court held that there had been 
compliance w ith s  31( 4) of  t he V AT A ct. The a pplicant’s a pplication w as dismissed with 
costs. 
 with approval and in support of the fact 
that the applicant would suffer no  prejudice as a  result of  not  having been afforded a  prior 
hearing before the s 47 notice.  
 
 
                                                          
155Ibid, para [8]. 
1562001 (2) SA 1026 (W). 
1572002 (3) SA 111(TkH). 
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2.1.3 THE “PAY NOW, ARGUE LATER” RULE 
Section 36(1) of the VAT Act provides that the obligation to pay tax and the right to receive 
and r ecover t ax s hall n ot, unl ess t he C ommissioner s o di rects, b e s uspended p ending a n 
objection or appeal or a decision by a court of law.158
Similarly couched provisions can also be found in the ITA
  
159 and the TAA160 read with the 
TALAA161
“[T]he common law rule of practice in terms of which the execution of a judgment is 
 automatically suspended upon the noting of an appeal, does not apply to a tax debt.”
.  Olivier points out that the effect of section 36(1) which is often referred to as the 
rule is that: 
162
The mere mention of the rule sends chills down the spines of many a taxpayer. The rule is an 
epitome of the wide powers conferred to the Commissioner pursuant to SARS’s efficient and 
effective collection of tax revenue objective. 
 
In Mokoena, Spilg J  made the following comments concerning the Commissioner’s powers 
and the exercise thereof:  
“The provision however is draconian and should therefore be exercised with care by properly 
 experienced and suitably qualified personnel since it may otherwise be reduced to an 
arbitrary guesstimate with grave consequences to the taxpayer. This is so because the 
Commissioner is entitled, even if there is an objection or an appeal, to seize and realise assets 
including money standing to the credit of the taxpayer’s bank account notwithstanding that 
these actions may jeopardise the taxpayer’s cash flow and business.”163
The rule is not used in isolation but it is complimented by other powers at the disposal of the 
Commissioner to enforce the collection of taxes due.






                                                          
158Act 89 of 1991.  
159S88 (1).    
160S164. 
161S58. 
162Olivier, 194. CIR v NCR Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 765(A). 
1632011 (2) SA 556 (GSJ), para [10]. 
164Keulder, C. “Pay now, argue later” rule – before and after the Tax Administration Act. 2013 PELJ  
    (16) 4 at 129 (Keulder).  
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Wunsh J lends support for this submission in the following terms in Hindry: 
“The purpose for which a person’s rights are limited by s 99 is …to facilitate and enhance his 
 (the Commissioner’s) ability to recover promptly taxes which are due and to avoid assets 
being put beyond his reach and, having regard to the need to speed up the collection of taxes 
and to prevent the frustration of the Commissioner’s efforts and steps to that end, the weapon 
is of great importance to the State. There is no suggestion of equally effective methods which 
could be used in the circumstances to achieve the desired needs.”165
In similar vein, Keulder postulates the view that:                                                                                                          
   
“[T]he ‘pay now, argue later’ rule, on its own, does not guarantee the effective collection of 
taxes but the enforcement procedures are such that SARS is assured of effectively collecting 
 taxes.” 166
The rule is applicable to all forms of tax. Williams
   
167
The s tatement pr ocedure
 gives a d etailed account of, inter alia, 
the m ost i mportant f orms of  t ax i n S outh A frica t o w hich, i t i s c ontended t hat, t he r ule i s 
applicable. The effect of the rule is unaffected by the form of tax. Williams submits that tax is 
primarily levied for the realization of certain objectives whose scope goes beyond this study.                                                                                                                                               
168
The transformation of South Africa from a parliamentary to a constitutional state has had a 
major impact on the South African legal system. Chief amongst which is the adoption of the 
Constitution w herein the B ill of  R ights
coupled w ith t he a ppointment of  a  t hird pa rty as a  t axpayer’s 
agent com pliment t he r ule and, when used collectively, are a f ormidable and effective t ax 
enforcement and collection mechanism in the Commissioner’s hands. It is appropriate at this 
point in time to pose the question, are there any remedies available to a taxpayer against the 
aforementioned draconian powers of the Commissioner?        
169 are e nshrined. F iscal l aws di d not  s urvive t he 
onslaught. T he ne w di spensation us hered a n e ra i n w hich t axpayers w ere c onferred w ith 
constitutional r ights,170
                                                          
165[1999] 2 All SA 38 (W), 63.  
 inter al ia, – right to:  pr operty, pr ivacy, a dministrative jus tice a nd 
access to courts.  
166Keulder, 130.  
167Williams, 2.  
168Metcash, para [24] for a detailed discussion thereof. 
169Chapter 2 of the Constitution.  
170Croome & Olivier, 10. 
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Concomitantly, taxpayers can challenge the constitutional validity of fiscal statutes that prima 
facie encroach upon such rights. The Rudolph171
The rule made its grand debut in the CC in Metcash where the court was called upon to make 
a de termination on t he c onstitutional va lidity of  sections 36( 1), 40( 2) ( a) a nd 40( 5) o f t he 
VAT Act.  
 saga bears testimony to this fact.  
The c ourt de clared t he impugned s ections of  t he V AT A ct c onstitutionally s ound. T his 
finding of the CC was not well received by vendors and arguably by taxpayers alike. 
The pe rception c reated i n t he m inds of  m any d espondent t axpayers following t he Metcash 
decision was that SARS’s paramount duty - when weighed against a taxpayer’s constitutional 
rights - in particular, the right of access to courts - took precedence. This, despite the court’s 
decision t hat s  36 (1) s trikes a ba lance be tween t he t wo competing i nterests. The Metcash 
decision is viewed with a jaundiced eye by many taxpayers primarily because the decision is 
prima facie, in c ontradiction w ith w hat t he C C s tands f or – a vanguard of constitutional 
rights!  
Lesapo and Metcash are CC judgments which were decided one year apart.  
The c ourt i n bot h cases w as called upon t o m ake a de termination on  t he constitutional 
validity of the impugned sections172
In Lesapo, t he i mpugned s ection 38( 2) o f t he A ct, w as d eclared u nconstitutional a nd 
constituted self-help in terms of which the Bank was judge in its own cause.  
 which, the applicants contended, were inconsistent with  
s 34 of the Constitution and thus ousted the jurisdiction of the courts. 
The court further held that less invasive remedies such as an interdict, were available to the 
Bank t o pr otect i ts pr oprietary i nterests. T o t he t axpayers’ di smay and contrary t o 
precedential pr inciples173
 
 and e xpectations, t he c ourt i n Metcash declared t he i mpugned 
sections of the VAT Act which the applicants contended were analogous to those dealt with 
in Lesapo, constitutionally sound.  
                                                          
171Rudolph &Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue & Others NNO 1994 (3) SA 771 (W);  
    Rudolph &Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue & Others 1996 (2) SA 886 (A);                                  
    Rudolph &Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue & Others 1996(4) SA 552 (CC) and         
    Rudolph &Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue & Others 1997 (4) SA 391(SCA).    
172S38 (2) the North West Agricultural Bank Act 14 of 1981 and ss 36 (1); 40(2) (a) and (5) of the VAT  




JUSTIFICATION FOR THE METCASH
• Metcash was concerned with the “pay now, argue later” rule in the context of the 
VAT Act and no other fiscal statute.
 decision lies in the following: 
174
• VAT, unlike income tax, is a  multi - stage tax that arises continuously and does 
not g ive r ise to liability onc e a n a ssessment ha s be en i ssued. V endors a re in a 
sense i nvoluntary t ax-collectors
  
175 or t hey a ct a s c ollection a gents on be half o f 
SARS.176
• vendors are entrusted with several impor tant du ties in relation to VAT. P rime 
amongst which is the duty to calculate and levy VAT on each supply of goods; to 
correctly calculate out put a nd i nput t ax on a  t ransaction c oncerned a nd to ke ep 
proper records supported by prescribed vouchers…
 
177
• the trial c ourt in Metcash1 placed heavy emphasis on Lesapo wherein t he 
impugned s ection o f t he A ct which w as s aid t o be  analogous t o t he i mpugned 
sections i n Metcash - expressly ous ted t he j urisdiction of  t he c ourts - permitted 
self-help, w as i nconsistent w ith s  34 of  t he Constitution a nd w as t herefore 
constitutionally invalid. 
   
• Lesapo was concerned with a  provision of  the Bank Act and not  a  f iscal s tatute 
and that the trial court erred in placing such heavy and unwarranted emphasis on 
Lesapo which is clearly distinguishable from Metcash.    
• section 36 (1) is not concerned with access to a court of law and says nothing that 
can be construed as a prohibition against a resort to such a court.178
• section 36  (1) i s concerned w ith t he non-suspension of  t he obl igation t o pa y 
assessed V AT a nd a lso w ith t he C ommissioner’s di scretionary pow ers t he 
exercise of w hich constitutes a dministrative a ction reviewable in terms of  
administrative law principles.
    
179
                                                          
174Keulder, 139. Metcash, paras [9], [10] & [13]. Croome & Olivier, 224.  
  
175Metcash, paras [17] and [70]. 
176Keulder, 139. 
177Metcash, para [15]. 
178Ibid, para [37]. 
179Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd & Others v CSARS & Others 1999 (3) SA1133 (W), 1144.  
    Johannesburg Stock Exchange & Another v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd & Another 1988 (3) SA132 (A),  
    152A-E.    
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• Section 36(1) does not expressly oust the jurisdiction of the courts nor is there any 
hidden or implicit ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts to be found in s 36…180
 
   
“On a plain reading of s 40 (2) (a) of the VAT Act, the provision expressly  
contemplates the involvement of the courts... [T]he execution process created by  s40 
(2) (a) specifically goes via the ordinary judicial institutions. It requires the 
intervention of court officials and procedures. Filing the statement sets in train the 
ordinary execution processes of the particular court”181
• the s tatement pr ocedure ha s t he ef fect of  a ci vil j udgment,
.  
182 the ex ecution of 
which ne cessitates t he i ntervention of  court of ficials. A ccordingly, a  t axpayer’s 
right of access to the courts remains intact.183
• [A]though s 40(5) is couched in broad and general terms:                                             
  
“It pertinently limits possible grounds for challenge but does not prohibit litigation. 
Not only is that the tenor of the provision but it is as well to remember  that we are 
engaged in the interpretation of a taxation statute, where verbal  precision is 
essential. Nothing that is not stated is to be read in, especially not an element as 
important as an ouster.”184
• the “pa y now, argue l ater “ rule given i ts pr evalence in many jurisdictions, is 
accepted as reasonable in open and democratic societies based on freedom, dignity 
and equality as required by section 36.
  
185
• the “pay no w, argue l ater” r ule s uccessfully s trikes a ba lance be tween SARS’s 
paramount dut y of  c ollecting t axes s peedily a nd e fficiently a nd t he t axpayer’s 
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182S40 (2) (a) of the VAT Act. Capstone, para [37].  
183Metcash, para [72]. 
184Ibid, para [53]. Jaga v Donges NO & Another ; Bhana v Donges NO & Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A), 662G- 
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The TAA, which came into force on 01 October 2012, brought relief to aggrieved taxpayers 
vis-à-vis the “pay now argue later” rule through the replication of factors to be considered by 
a s enior S ARS of ficial when de ciding on a t axpayer’s r equest t o s uspend pa yment o f a  
disputed  t ax de bt. T he Taxation L aws S econd A mendment A ct 18 of  2009 ( TLSA) f irst 
introduced these factors by amending section 88 of the ITA. 
The relevant provision of the TAA states that: 
“A senior SARS official may suspend payment of the disputed tax having regard to –                                                                                                                    
(a) the compliance history of the taxpayer;                                                                                          
(b) the amount of tax involved;                                                                                                                 
(c) the risk of dissipation of assets by the taxpayer concerned during the period of 
suspension;                                                                                                                                    
(d) whether the taxpayer is able to provide adequate security for the payment of the 
amount involved;                                                                                                                                      
(e) whether the payment of the amount involved would result in irreparable financial 
hardship to the taxpayer;                                                                                                                                        
(f) whether sequestration or liquidation proceedings are imminent;                                                              
(g) whether fraud is involved in the origin of the dispute; or                                                                         
(h) whether the taxpayer has failed to furnish information requested under this Act 
for purposes of a decision under this section.”
                                                       
187
The above – mentioned provision of the TAA is being cited for the following reasons-  
 
• although t he w ording o f s ection 36 of the  V AT A ct is  to a greater e xtent 
analogous to section 88 of the ITA and section 164 of  the TAA in that they both 
deal with the “pay now, argue later” rule - section 36 is silent on the factors to be 
considered b y a C ommissioner w hen de ciding on a  t axpayer’s r equest f or t he 
postponement of a disputed assessment. 
• s164 of the TAA read with s 58 of  the TALAA provides more clarity and has a  
wider scope of application in that it also incorporates an appeal as a precondition 
for the suspension of payment.      
 
                                                          
187S164 (3) of the TAA. 
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Section 164(5) of the TAA sets out circumstances under which a senior SARS official may 
deny a request or  revoke a  decision to suspend payment with immediate effect, if satisfied 
that:                                                          
(a) the objection or appeal is frivolous or vexatious; 
(b) the taxpayer is employing dilatory tactics; 
(c) the suspension of payment should not have been granted; or 
(d) there is a material change in the factors that precipitated the suspension of payment. 
2.1.3.1 CRITICISMS - METCASH  
2.1.3.1.1 CRITICISMS BY KEULDER  
The following criticisms have been levelled against Metcash: 
Keulder postulates the view that while an adjustment and payment of interest as a result of a 
successful appeal is a feat welcomed by many taxpayers188, the latter are not insulated from 
experiencing financial ruin for strict adherence to the rule.189
Taking her cue from Olivier,
  
190 Keulder submits that if the grounds upon w hich a taxpayer 
can dispute the filing of a statement were clear, the latter’s right of access to the courts would 
be better protected191
Keulder further s tates that f rom the mere reading of  Metcash 1 and Metcash it is  not  c lear 
which countries s erved as  a  ba sis f or t he court’s de cision that t he rule i s a ccepted as  
reasonable i n open and democratic s ocieties.
.    
192 In dismissing t he r espondent’s s ubmission 
that this practice - “pay now, argue later” rule – was applicable in other countries Snyders J in 
Metcash 1 held t hat t his di d not  pe rsuade her t hat t he S outh A frican pr ovision i s 
constitutional.193
                                                          
188S36 (5) of the VAT Act. 
   
189Keulder, 128. 
190Olivier, 199. 
191Keulder, 141.  
192Ibid.  
1932002 (2) SA 232 (W), 329. 
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A further criticism made by Keulder is that the remedies available to a court when reviewing 
a commissioner’s discretion not to suspend payment are circumscribed. Keulder submits that 
the court does not have the power to overturn the commissioner’s decision.194
On the contrary, the court is empowered in judicial review proceedings to grant any order that 
is just and equitable including an order directing the commissioner to give reasons; act in the 




It is submitted that it is unclear what the basis of this criticism is relative to section 8(1) (c) of 
PAJA. The phrase ‘set aside’ bears the following meaning – “…disregard or reject, annul”
   
196 
while the phrase ‘overturn’ means - “turn over or fall  down, upset, overthrow, subvert”.197
It is  s ubmitted that prima facie, t he two phrases be ar t he s ame m eaning or ha ve a s imilar 
import. There is  merit in  the criticism only insofar as the lack of clarity as to the extent to 
which the court may set aside the administrative action is concerned. 
 
Keulder s tates t hat t he va lue of  t he review procedure i s f urther di minished w hen t he 
statement procedure is invoked, as the taxpayer may then not challenge the correctness of the 
statement in legal proceedings.198
A further criticism is that:            
 
“[T]he constitutional attack on the s 36 rule therein lies that the right of access to the courts, 
 as contained in section 34 of the Constitution, aims to prevent self- help. The court should 
 thus have examined whether this rule, at the time it is invoked, unreasonably permits SARS 
‘help itself’ and become the judge in its own case. The question, therefore, should not be  
 whether the taxpayer will have access to the courts at some stage, but rather whether the 
taxpayer will have the opportunity to access the courts before being obliged to pay the 
assessment amount.”199
It is  Keulder’s further criticism that Metcash was concerned only with the “pay now, argue 
later” rule in relation to VAT and has no binding effect on other tax legislation.  
    
                                                          
194Ibid. 
195Ibid, 140. S8 (1) and (2) of the PAJA. 
196Allen, R.E. The Pocket Oxford Dictionary, 7 ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1984). 
197 Ibid.      




Keulder submits further hat the considerations which influenced the court in arriving at the 
decision in Metcash would not necessarily lead to the same conclusion in relation to income 
tax matters.200
2.1.3.1.2 CRITICISMS BY WILLIAMS 
           
Williams, echoes the same sentiments in the following terms –  
“The fact is that, in Metcash, the Constitutional Court pronounced on the constitutionality of 
 the pay-now-argue-later rule in the context of the Value - Added Tax Act, but said nothing at 
all about its constitutionality in the context of the Income Tax Act. It is by no means a 
foregone conclusion that the court would have reached the same conclusion if income tax had 
been an issue, for there are many significant differences between the two taxes, not the least 
being that there is far more scope for genuine disputation about income tax liability than for 
VAT.”201
Williams further states that the ITA (and in similar vein the TAA) provides no guidance as to 
the relative weight of the factors to be considered by the Commissioner when confronted with 




Williams highlights the ongoing confusion and misunderstanding regarding the  
  
“pay now, argue later” rule in the context of the income tax by making reference to Mokoena 
and Capstone - two High Court judgments decided a year apart and “which came to 
diametrically opposite conclusions on key aspects of the rule”.203
Williams correctly states that the aforementioned decisions:   
  
“being High Court judgments of a single judge, have the same precedential authority over 





                                                          
200Ibid, 139. 






While Williams prefers Capstone on the basis of it being more persuasive than Mokoena, he 
bemoans the fact that neither judgment provides guidance in relation to the manner in which  
the s 88(3) factors of the ITA and s 164(3) factors of the TAA read with s 58 of the TALAA 
are to be interpreted.205
Williams f urther cr iticises t he r elevance of  s ome of  t he f actors s uch as t he am ount of  ta x 
involved. H e pos es t he question w hether t he qu antum of  t he t ax de bt i s t he yardstick f or 
determining whether to grant or refuse suspension of payment?
 
206
In the final analysis, Williams concludes by focusing our attention on a n instance where the 
Commissioner m akes a n a dverse d ecision t o t he t axpayer’s r equest f or s uspension of  a n 
obligation to pay. The taxpayer is at liberty to review that decision in terms of PAJA
  
207
Williams cites the following as being the substantial reason often advanced by a taxpayer to 
persuade the court to deviate from the rule: 
. The 
general rule on the basis of which a taxpayer’s review application will be determined is that 
the taxpayer’s obligation to pay shall not be suspended pending an objection or appeal unless 
there exists a substantial reason to depart from the general rule.  
- where i nsistence on immediate pa yment of  t he t ax de bt w ould cause “irreparable 
financial hardship” to the taxpayer. 
To this end Williams states that:                                                                                                                                      
“[t]he adjective ‘irreparable’ sets the bar very high, and it is probably an inappropriate word 
anyway, since any amount of financial loss is inherently reparable by an award of 
damages.”208
In a counter argument Keulder submits that:          
      
“[t]his might, however, not be the case where a taxpayer is rendered insolvent. The objection 
and appeal procedure may take a substantial amount of time which could severely prejudice a 
taxpayer and even lead to the taxpayer’s sequestration or liquidation.”209
 
   
                                                          
205Ibid. 
206Ibid. 
207S6, Act 3 of 2000.  
208Williams, RC Unresolved aspects of the “pay now argue later” rule January 2012, PWC Synopsis 6. Keulder,  




2.1.3.1.3 CRITICISMS BY ROOD 
Rood, L. submits that the commissioner is, in the context of the rule, still a judge in a dispute 
to which he is a party.210
For, if it is an allegation of fraud that is to be taken into consideration, this would be unfair to 
a taxpayer as he would not have been afforded an opportunity to defend himself against such 
an allegation.
 He further states that it is not clear from a mere reading of s 164(3) 
whether the fraud referred to therein relates to alleged fraud or an actual conviction of fraud.  
211
2.1.3.1.4 CRITICISMS BY OLIVIER 
   
At the  out set, Olivier s tates t hat t he s ummary p rocedures - it is  s ubmitted that b y thi s s he 
refers collectively t o s ections 36(1), 40(2) ( a), 4 0(5) and 47 o f t he VAT Act and s imilarly 
couched provisions of the ITA and TAA read with the TALAA  
– “are aimed at the swift collection of tax, not the settlement of the matter.”212
Olivier states that it is incomprehensible why the court in Metcash (vide para [44]) cited a list 
of cases wherein the jurisdiction of the high court to determine tax issues had been accepted 
since:  
     
“it was never the taxpayer’s argument that under the scheme of the act the jurisdiction of the 
 courts had been excluded. The argument was that the ‘pay now, argue later’ rule excludes 
the jurisdiction of the courts at the time it is invoked.”213
Olivier submits t hat t he court e rred b y di sregarding the f act t hat t he “pay now, a rgue l ater 
rule” may culminate in a taxpayer suffering financial ruin to the extent of not being able to 
pursue other avenues at his disposal.
   
214
Olivier poi nts out  tha t theoretically, the pos sible judi cial r eview of  th e c ommissioner’s 
discretion not  t o s uspend pa yment o f t ax pe nding an obj ection or  appeal doe s a llow a 
taxpayer access to the courts. Olivier further states that:  
   
“review proceedings are, however, extremely limited in nature”215
                                                          









This criticism has been assailed by Keulder as being unclear and devoid of a basis216
Details of  t he grounds o n w hich a  de cision m ay be  r eviewed a re s et out  i n Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd
.   
217
- failure to apply one’s mind to the relevant issues; 
 as being: 
- that the decision was arbitrary or capricious or mala fide; 
- that the decision was as a result of an unwarranted adherence to a fixed principle;  
- that the decision was arrived at in order to further an ulterior or improper purpose; 
- that the decision was as a result of taking into account irrelevant considerations or 
ignoring relevant facts and 
- that the decision was grossly unreasonable. 
Olivier poses the question whether the review procedure is worth anything when a taxpayer is 
precluded from questioning the correctness of the assessment on which the statement based?                                                          
Olivier submits that:                                              
“the ground on the basis of which a decision is often taken on review is that it is so grossly 
 unreasonable that the decision-maker failed to apply his mind to the matter”218
Concomitantly, the correctness of such decision or in this case - the assessment - would have 
to be considered for the applicant’s review application to succeed.          
 
Olivier further submits that it is regrettable that the court in Metcash did not address the fact 
that a lthough a  c ommissioner mus t, in terms of  s  31  notify a t axpayer of a n assessment; 
nothing prohibits him from employing the summary collection procedures before a vendor is 
notified219. Such was the case in Mokoena220and Support Services.221  It is  Olivier’s further 
submission that despite the fact that the exercise of discretionary powers is subject to review, 
the l egislature s till ha s a n obl igation t o e nsure t hat s uch provisions are constitutionally 
sound.222
                                                          
216Keulder, 140 (vide footnote 114).  
  
2171988 (3) SA 132(A) 152 A- E. 
218 Olivier, 197. 
219Ibid. 
2202011 (2) SA 556 (GSJ).  
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Olivier r aises a concern to the e ffect that it is  d isquieting tha t the  court di d not make any 
reference t o Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; 
Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs where it was held that:  
“[T]he mere fact that the exercise of a discretion is subject to judicial review does not relieve 
 the legislature of its constitutional obligation to promote, protect and fulfil the rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights”223
Olivier postulates the view that as a result of the enactment of the Constitution the normative 
basis of administrative law in SA shifted.  
.     
This fact is canvassed in detail in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex 
Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 224
According to Olivier references t o judicial i ndependence and the exercise of  di scretionary 
powers are equally applicable to a discretion exercised by the commissioner. 
(Pharmaceutical)  
Instead, all that the court in Metcash held in this regard was that:                                                                                                                                                                           
“[T]he commissioner has to be able to justify his decision as being rational, and that the 
 action must constitute  ‘just administrative’ as required under s 33 of the Constitution and be 
in compliance with any legislation governing the review of administrative actions”.225
The court in Metcash held that the certificate procedure in terms of  the VAT Act does not  
constitute self-help as s 40(2) (a) contemplates the involvement of the courts. The court held 
further that the f iling of a certificate sets in motion the ordinary processes of the particular 
court. Execution is primarily regulated by either the Uniform Rules of the High Court (Rules 
45,45A and 46) or by the Magistrates’ Court Rules (Rule 36). 
     
226
Olivier points out that the setting in motion of the execution procedures of a specific court is 
a far cry from the right of access to court.  
 
Nowhere in the VAT Act is provision made for the taxpayer to be informed in advance of the 
commissioner’s int ention to file a  c ertificate. It is  thus  not  a  ma tter of  a de fault judgment 
being obtained against a taxpayer.227
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Olivier’s further criticism is that the grounds upon which a taxpayer can dispute the filing of 
the certificate are not clear.228
All that the court said in this respect was that:  
  
“it is notorious that the field of tax law can and often does raise a whole panoply of 
 procedural or substantive issues derived from one or more of the individually complex and 
usually interlocking fields of law involved in tax disputes.”229
In support of Keulder’s criticism relating to foreign systems and decisions that influenced the 
court’s d ecision that t he r ule i s ac cepted as  r easonable i n open and de mocratic s ocieties, 
Olivier submits that:  
 
“the reader is thus left in the dark as to which foreign systems and decisions indeed serve or 
 do not serve as an international basis of acceptance.”230
The court in Kruger found that the certificate procedure is not merely an administrative step 
aimed at f acilitating th e e xtra - judicial r ecovery of t ax
    
231
To this end, Olivier postulates the view that: 
 but tha t it is  a  pr oper judi cial 
decision reviewable at the instance of the taxpayer. 
“the mere fact that the judgment obtained may be rescinded is no guarantee that at the time 
 the statement is filed, a taxpayer has access to the court with which it is filed. In practice an 
order to rescind the judgment is often made precisely because it was obtained without the 
taxpayer having knowledge that a statement has been filed.”232
The court in Capstone
     
233
• it did not resolve any dispute between  SARS and the taxpayer; 
 held that a statement filed with the clerk or registrar of a competent 
court is not a judgment on the following grounds: 
• it does not have the attributes of a judgment such as -“the rights-determining character 
of a judicially delivered judgment”234
• it is a mere recovery provision no different from the other recovery provisions in the 
Act.  
;  
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Olivier correctly submits that:  
“the court in Metcash did not address the applicant’s argument that there were less invasive 
 ways to effect the speedy and efficient collection of taxes”. 235
The applicant raised this view at the trial court and also in the constitutional court.  
 
Snyders J in Metcash1 lent support to the applicant’s argument by highlighting the following 
as l ess i nvasive w ays that t he C ommissioner c ould ha ve r ecourse t o pur suant t o hi s 
paramount duty, namely: 
 higher penalties; 
 the furnishing of security; 
 higher interest rates or 
 time-linked penalties.  
In similar vein, Keulder makes the following submission:  
“The possibility that there are less invasive ways for SARS to achieve its objective is one of 
 the factors the court would have had to consider in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.”236
Olivier concludes her criticism of Metcash in the following terms: 
   
“The constitutional court found it unnecessary to deal specifically with the taxpayer’s 
 arguments that as the summary procedures are also applicable in respect of the penalty 
provisions; the effect is that the commissioner may impose punishment for criminal conduct 
without recourse to the courts”237
2.2 TAXPAYER’S REMEDIES 
.     
From the above discussion, the following feature predominantly as the t axpayer’s remedies 
against the draconian powers of the Commissioner: 
(a) lodging of an objection238
(b) noting an appeal against a disputed assessment;
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(c) making an application for the suspension of payment240
(d) making an application for the review of the Commissioner’s decision
pending an objection or appeal 
or decision of a court; 
241
(e) making an application to directly access the Constitutional Court
 and lastly 
242
In the case of direct access to the CC section 38 of the Constitution confers an aggrieved 
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REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A r eview of  t he relevant l egislation w ill be  c onfined t o t axpayers’ r emedies unde r t he 
Constitution and PAJA. It is contended that the relevance of the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium 
- “[T]here can be no right without remedies”243
There has been an inevitable overemphasis in the preceding chapters on l itigation as if i t is 
the only recourse available to a disgruntled taxpayer. It is contended that there’s an array of 
remedies at the disposal of taxpayers when SARS acts beyond the parameters of its authority. 
This chapter entails a brief discussion of such remedies and their relevance to the rule. 
- is more appropriate in this chapter.  
3.1.1 A CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL & PAJA REMEDIES  
The CC confirmed the constitutionality of the rule in Metcash.244
“[N]otwithstanding the CC’s decision in Metcash, an aggrieved taxpayer may institute an 
 action in court against the Commissioner’s resolve to unreasonably enforce payment of a 
disputed tax pending an appeal”
 Croome correctly contends 
that: 
245
Croome submits further that: 
.   
“the action would be based on the principles of administrative law and particularly on the 
right to administrative justice contained in s 33 of the Constitution read with PAJA”246
The court per Kriegler J in Metcash echoed similar sentiments in the following terms:     
.  
 “A violation of the rules of administrative justice provides the ground for such challenge.”247
SARS i s an organ o f s tate envisaged in the Constitution.
              
248 The court in FNB 249
                                                          
243Caiden, GE International Handbook of the Ombudsman: Evolution and Present Function.  
 held that 
SARS is subject to the Constitution.  
    Greenwood Press, (1983), 5. Croome, 305. 
2442001 1 BCLR 1 (CC). Motsepe 1997(2) SA 897 (CC); Lesapo [1999] ZACC16 and Hindry 1999(2)  
    SA 757 (W). 
245Croome, 220.  
246Ibid. 
247Metcash, para [42]. 
248S239 of the Constitution. S2 of the SARS Act. 
2492002 (7) JTLR 250,252. 
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With the enactment of the Constitution, South Africa was transformed into a democratic state 
that is founded, 
“inter alia, on the value of an accountable, responsible and open democratic government.”250
Croome correctly submits that:  
     
“the Constitution puts it beyond doubt that all organs of state must be held accountable.”251
The CC in Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security and Another
   
252
Croome submits in similar vein that:                                                     
 held that members of 
the public are entitled to claim compensation from the government for damages suffered due 
to the actions or omissions of government officials.   
“[A] taxpayer who suffers damages due to intentional or negligent actions by SARS will be 
entitled to successfully institute a delictual claim against SARS. In the light of the 
constitutional guarantee that South Africa is based on the values of an accountable, 
responsible and open democratic government, SARS owes taxpayers a legal duty not to cause 
them damage.”253
The Constitution confers a  r ight to administrative action on taxpayers.
        
254  The Constitution 
further provides for the enactment of national legislation that gives effect to the rights stated 
in s 33.255
Croome correctly contends that:   
 It is submitted that PAJA is such national legislation and that it should be read with 
as it compliments the Constitution.  
“It should be noted that PAJA cannot be used to evaluate whether a constitutionally 
 guaranteed right has been infringed. The constitutional challenge must be evaluated under   
s33 of the Constitution.  
However, PAJA r emains r elevant in that the  r ight to fair administrative a ction in the 
Constitution must be interpreted according to the provisions of PAJA”256  Croome correctly 
submits that: “PAJA is applicable to the Commissioner and his officials.”257
 
  
                                                          
250S1 of the Constitution. Croome, 282.    
251Croome, 282. ss195 & 41(1) (c) of the Constitution.   
2522001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
253Croome, 282. 
254S33 of the Constitution. 
255S33 (3) of the Constitution. 
256Croome, 279. Zondi v MEC for Traditional & Local Government Affairs 2005v(3) SA 589 (CC) paras  
    99 – 102. TML Consultancy v CSARS [2012] ZATC 1 and Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v  
    Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13 for the interpretation of tax legislation.  
257Croome, 209.  
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In similar vein, Currie & Klaaren postulate the view that: 
“PAJA applies to all administrators and no part of the public service is exempt from its 
provisions”258
Taking his cue from Pharmaceutical where it was held that: 
.  
“the Constitutional Court is obliged to ensure that public power has been lawfully 
 exercised”259
Croome submits that:  
. 
“the aim of PAJA is not only to ensure fair administrative action, but it is aimed at the control 
of public power”.260
Croome submits further that:  
 
“an analysis of relevant cases indicates that taxpayers are hardly ever successful in arguing 
 that a fiscal statute or provision thereof is unconstitutional.”261
It i s f or t his r eason t hat i t i s c ontended t hat not  a ll i s doom  a nd gloom f or t he aggrieved 
taxpayer. According to Croome,  
   
“An action based on the violation of the rules of administrative justice may, depending on the 
 facts, be the most suitable remedy available to the taxpayer”.262
In the light of the above discussion, it is contended that a case has been established that the 
Constitution and PAJA and consequently the remedies provided therein, are applicable in the 
tax law arena and by extension to the rule.   
  




                                                          
258 Currie, I & Klaaren, J. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook. Cape Town: Siber Ink,  
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3.2 CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES  
        3.2.1 Purpose 
Du Plessis et al (Du Plessis) submit that the primary purpose of constitutional remedies is:  
“to vindicate the Constitution and deter future infringements…”263
In FNB, the court stated that:  
    
“The remedy must be effective because without effective remedies for breach, the values 
  underlying and the rights entrenched in the Constitution cannot properly be upheld or 
 enhanced.”264
Another impor tant f eature of  constitutional r emedies is  “what is just and equitable in the 
circumstances of that case”
                                                                                                                       
265
        3.2.2 Direct access to the Constitutional Court   
. 
The Constitution provides for circumstances under which direct access to the Constitutional 
Court ( CC)266
 “[o]ne of the primary reasons why direct access is ordinarily regarded as undesirable is 
  because it deprives the court of the benefits and the assistance of the views of other courts 
 on the matter before it.”
 may b e granted. T he C C doe s not , a s a  general r ule, s it a s a  c ourt of  f irst 
instance. Du Plessis submits that:                                                                                                                                                                                          
267
A taxpayer seeking direct access must, according to Du Plessis:  
 





                                                          
263Du Plessis, M. Pinfolds, G. & Brickhill, J. Constitutional Litigation. Claremont: Juta, (2013), 108. 
2641997 (3) SA 786 (CC), para 96. 
265Ibid, para 19. 
266S167 (6) (a) read with Rule 18(1) to (5) of the Constitution. 
267Du Plessis, 83. Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs & Others 2005 (3) SA  
    589 (CC), para 13; Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005(1) SA 530(CC),  
    para 11 and Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524(CC), para 39.   




 the interests of justice
 submits f urther tha t a ll of  the  f ormalities me ntioned hereunder - a de tailed 
discussion of  w hich f alls out side t he s cope of  t his r esearch - must be  satisfied for di rect 
access to be granted: 
270
 the exhaustion of all other remedies
; 
271
 a non self - created urgent need for legal certainty
; 
272
 substantial s imilarity be tween the r elief s ought b y applicant a nd that s ought b y 
parties in a matter already before the CC
;  
273






   3.2.3. LIST OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES  
, the CC does grant direct access. 
(a)  Right of access to courts  
Hoexter states that:                                                                                                                                                          
“South African taxpayers currently have an inherent right under s 34 of the Constitution to  
 approach a court for relief where SARS has abused the powers under the fiscal statutes or 
has failed to comply with the requirement of fair administrative procedure under s 33 of the 
Constitution and as expanded on in PAJA. The only problem that taxpayers have to contend 
with is that it is costly and time consuming to institute an action in the High Court.”276
A taxpayer may in t erms of  s  39 o f t he Constitution approach the CC f or r elief where t he 
former be lieves tha t the  C ommissioner ha s inf ringed his constitutional r ights c ontained i n 
chapter 2 of the Constitution. It is contended that since SARS is a state organ, it must comply 
with s 195 of the Constitution. 
 
 
                                                          
269Ibid, 89. 
270Ibid, 83. Bruce & Another v Fleecytex Johannesburg CC & Others 1998 (2) SA 1143 (CC), paras  
    7& 8. 
271Du Plessis, 85. Besserlik v Minster of Trade, Industry & Tourism 1996 (4) SA 331 (CC), para 6.  
272Du Plessis, 87. Kruger v President of the RSA & Others 2009 (1) SA 417 (CC).  
273Du Plessis, 88. Bhe & Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).  
274Du Plessis, 89.Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 1999 (2) SA 83 (CC),  
     para 7.  
275Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2011 (5) SA  
    388 (CC) para 18. S v Dlamini; S v Dladla & Others 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) para 35. 
276 Hoexter, C. The New Constitutional & Administrative Law Volume 2, Administrative Law.  
     Claremont: Juta, (2002), para 8.5, 305.       
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(b) Declaration of invalidity  
Croome submits that:  
“where an Act of Parliament is inconsistent with the Constitution, the CC has the power to strike 
 it down”.277
(c) Delictual claim for damages 
 
Croome submits that:  
“to succeed with a delictual claim for damages against SARS, a taxpayer must prove that the 
 wrongful or culpable actions or inactions by SARS caused him to suffer damage” 278
Croome further submits that: 
 
 “damages will be awarded where a mere declaration that the administrative action is invalid 
  is not sufficient compensation to the person against whom the administrative action had 
 been taken.”279
This view was endorsed by the court in FNB.
                        
280
(d)  Order for costs 
    
Three types of costs may be awarded, namely: 
• party and party costs – also known as ‘attorney and attorney costs’; 
• attorney and client costs and 
• de bonis propriis costs281
Croome correctly submits that:                                                                                                                                                             
      




                                                          
277Croome, 279. SS 167(5) & 172(1) (a) of the Constitution. Metcash; Motsepe, Hindry, Lesapo,  
    Support Services, Mpande & Smartphone in chapter 2. Rudolph v CIR NNO 1996 (7) BCLR 
    889 (CC). Carlson Investments Share Block (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 2001 (3) SA 210 (W). Silke, J. 
    Taxpayers and the Constitution: A battle already lost. 2002 Acta Juridica 334. 
278Croome, 280. S1 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957. 
279Ibid, 279. 
2801997 (3) SA 786 (CC). Transnet Ltd v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd 2005 (1) SA 299 (SCA). Olitziki  
    Property Holdings v The State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA).     
281Croome, 284. 
282Ibid. Modibane v SARS [2011] ZAGPJHC 152. 
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(e) Declaratory orders   
The C onstitution c onfers pow ers t o c ourts t o grant de claratory or ders.283 The C C g ranted 
declaratory orders in Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others.284





Interdicts ma ybe divided into t wo m ain c ategories, na mely pr ohibitory or  m andatory 
interdicts286. The court may either grant an interim interdict or a final interdict.  The court in 
Setlogelo v Setlogelo287
(g)  The Public Protector & The Human Rights Commission 
 stipulated requirements that must be satisfied by an applicant seeking 
an interdict. 
Croome288
• The SMO (Service Monitoring Office); 
 further contends t hat t he f ollowing i nstitutions pr ovide r emedies t o a ggrieved 
taxpayers: 
• The Public Protector289
• The Human Rights Commission
; 
290
While a detailed discussion of the above institutions l ies beyond the scope of this research, 
Croome postulates the view that the popularity of these remedial institutions is overshadowed 
by the fact that:  
  
“taxpayers are loath to lodge complaints against the Commissioner for fear of 
 victimisation291
                                                          
283S 38 of the Constitution. 
.  
2842002 (5) SA 721 (CC), paras 129 and 135. 
285S 19(1) (a) (iii) of the High Court Act 59 of 1959. Langa CJ & Others v Hlophe 2009 (4) SA  
    382 (SCA), para 28. Ex Parte Nell 1963 (1) SA 754 (A), 759. Reinecke v Incorporated General  
    Insurance Limited 1974 (2) SA 84 (A), 93. 
    Du Plessis, 120-1. 
286Du Plessis, 121-3. 
2871914 AD 221. Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W). Janse van Rensburg NO & Another v Min. 
    of Trade & Industry & Another NNO 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC), para 32. National Treasury & Others v  
    Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance & Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC), paras 41 & 45.  
288Croome, 309 -17.  
289S182 (1) (a), (b) & (c) and (2);( 4) & (5) of the Constitution and s 6 (1) to (9) of the Public Protector Act 23 
     of 1994. 




It is  s ubmitted that ta xpayers’ awareness of  th e s ervices tha t the  P ublic P rotector a nd the 
Human Rights Commission offer should be heightened by SARS through training, print and 
electronic media and pamphleteering. Croome correctly submits that:                                                                                                            
“[T]he Human Rights Commission, like the Public Protector, does not have the specialized 
  skills required to deal with taxpayers’ complaints and cannot offer them an effective remedy 
 for alleged breaches of their rights… The inevitable conclusion is that the South African 
taxpayers do not currently have a cost – effective method of dealing with difficulties with the 
Commissioner.”292
3.3 PAJA REMEDIES    
  
      3.3.1 Just administrative action 
The right to just administrative action is one of the three inextricably linked procedural rights 
that the Constitution confers on  taxpayers. To be  just, administrative action must be lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair293. This requirement begs the question – what is the effect and 
status of the common law on administrative action? The court in Pharmaceutical held that the 
Constitution subsumes the common law principles of administrative law.294For administrative 
action to be  reasonable, Hoexter submits that it must be rational and proportional.295
“many decisions taken by the Commissioner constitute administrative action and are 
 thus subject to the right to administrative justice
 Croome 
contends that:  
296
It is  C roome’s f urther c ontention that f or a  ta xpayer to succeed with a jus t a dministrative 
action - claim, he must show that:                                                                                                     
. 




                                                          
292Ibid, 312. 
293S33 (1) & (2) of the Constitution. S 3(1) & (2) of PAJA, purpose and preamble thereto as well.     
2942000 (2) SA 674 (CC), para 46. Currie, I. & Klaaren, J. para 1, 24 & 25. 
295Hoexter, C. Administrative Law in South Africa. 2 ed. Claremont : Juta, (2007), 307 & 309-10  
296Croome, B. Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa. Claremont: Juta, (2010) 206 (Croome). 
297Ibid, 204-5. President of the Republic of SA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC), para 141. Greys Marine  
    Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd & Others v Minister of Public Works & Others 2004 (12) BCLR 1298 (C), 1308.    
    Gamevest (Pty) Ltd v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Northern Province and Mpumalanga &  
    Others 2003 (1) SA 373 (SCA), 385.    
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PAJA’s definition of ‘administrative action’ encompasses a refusal by the Commissioner to 
take a decision298
   3.3.2 Judicial review of administrative action 
.   
The main remedy under PAJA is the judicial review of administrative action299
“[W]hen administrative action is taken on review; it has to be reviewed on the grounds 
 provided for in PAJA and not on the narrower grounds provided for under the common-
law.”
. The court in 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others (Bato) stated that:     
300
   3.3.3 Exhaustion of internal remedies  
 
Notwithstanding t he pe remptory provisions of  P AJA r egarding t he exhaustion of  i nternal 
remedies ere t he commencement of  j udicial r eview pr oceedings,301
“[T]here would be no purpose in using internal remedies available since the regulator 
 showed bias against Gold Fields.”
 the court i n Goldfields 
Ltd v Connellan NO & Others held that:                                          
302
Stringent c riticisms ha ve be en levelled at s  7( 2) of  P AJA. Prime a mongst s uch critics is  
Plasket who retorted as follows:  
 
“It places a particularly onerous burden on those who wish to review the lawfulness, 
 reasonableness or procedural fairness of administrative action first to exhaust internal 
remedies and curtail the power of the courts to review administrative action when internal 
remedies have not been exhausted. In this note it will be submitted that s7 (2) of the Act is an 
unconstitutional infringement of the right to access to court entrenched in s 34 of the 
Constitution. Even if it is unconstitutional, it will be submitted that it is ill-conceived, unfair, 
and impractical and ought to be reconsidered by the legislature.”303
                                                          
298S1 of PAJA. 
         
299Croome & Olivier, 278. SS 6 & 8 of PAJA. 
3002004 (4) SA 490 (CC), paras 22 & 25. Williams, R.C. SARS & fair administrative action: Quo Vadis?                  
     (31 January 2013), Tax Talk 24 -25. Investigations Directorate : Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai  
     Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO & Another [2000]  
     ZACC 12. Corpclo 2290 CC t/a U-Care v Registrar of Banks (755/2011) [2012] ZASCA 156. Western Cape  
     High Court v City of Cape Town 2011 (6) SA 88 (WCC). City of Cape Town v Bouley Properties (Pty) Ltd  
     [2010] ZAWCHC 650.   
301S7 (2) of PAJA.  
302[2005] 3 All SA 142 (W), 169. 
303Plasket, C. ‘The Exhaustion of Internal Remedies and S 7(2) of PAJA 3 of 2000’ (2002) 119 SALJ  




“[A] court may review a case before internal remedies are exhausted.”
 Croome concludes that: 
305
It is  s ubmitted that w hile the af orementioned criticisms ar e va lid and persuasive - s 7( 2) 
provisions of  P AJA r emain i n f orce and e ffect. O’Regan J  i n Bato cautioned a gainst t he 
possibility of  dupl ication or  c ontradictory r elief
 
306
It is further contended that section 7(2) (c) of PAJA provides for circumstances under which 
the exhaustion of available internal remedies - requirement may be circumvented. 
 in the eve nt w here a l itigant r equests a  
court to review a decision before the exhaustion of available internal remedies.  
    3.3.4 Grounds of review    
The grounds for the review of administrative action are explicitly stated in PAJA307
    3.3.5 Formalities  
 
• SARS falls within the institutions referred to in s 1; 
For a taxpayer to rely on PAJA remedies he must show that: 
• the Commissioner has actually made a decision or failed to do so; 
• the Commissioner made a decision under an ‘empowering provision’ defined 
in s 1;   
• the Commissioner’s decision constitutes ‘administrative action’ as envisaged 
in s 33 of the Constitution; 
• the Commissioner’s action or inaction falls within the ambit of s 1; 
• the Commissioner’s decision adversely affects his rights308
     
   
 
 
                                                          
3042004 (4) SA 490 (CC), para 17.  
305Croome, 237.  
306Bato, para 17. 
307S6 (2) (a) – (i) and S6 (3) (a) & (b) of PAJA. Croome, 232-6. Currie & Klaaren, 153 -174.              
    CSARS v Hawker Aviation Services Partnership & Others 2005 (5) SA 238 (T). S v Roberts 1999 (4)  
    SA 915 (SCA) paras 32 & 34. BRT Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal & Allied Workers’ Union  
    1992 (3) SA 673 (A). Scenematic Fourteen (Pty) Ltd v Min. of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and  
    Another 2004 (4) BCLR 430 (C), 443. Minister of Health & Another NO v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd & 
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308Croome, 209-11. Croome & Olivier, 27 -9. 
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 3.3.6 Reasons for administrative action 
A taxpayer whose rights have been adversely and materially affected by administrative action 
is, upon request, entitled to being furnished with written reasons for such decision.309
The court in Swissborough Diamond (Pty) Ltd & Others v Govt. of RSA & Others 
  
310
4. OTHER REMEDIES 
made 
comments that constitute a useful guide to the adequacy of reasons to be provided.   
    (a) Doctrine of legitimate expectation 
In the final analysis, Croome contends that the doctrine of legitimate expectation espoused by 
the court in Administrator, Transvaal & Others v Traub & Others311
“it allows an extension and applicability of the rules of natural justice and would under PAJA 
 form part of an evaluation whether the ‘administrative action’ is procedurally fair.”
 is applicable in the tax 
arena in the following terms: 
312
  (b) SARS Service Charter (The Charter) 
 
On 19 December 2005 SARS released the Service Charter. According to Croome, the Charter 
did not create new rights nor did it indicate how taxpayers might enforce their rights313
Croome contends further that: 
.  
“the rationale behind the release of the Charter was to heighten taxpayers’ awareness of 
 their rights and to improve the culture of service within SARS in its interaction with 
taxpayers”314
The Charter does not create any rights enforceable by a taxpayer in a court of law.  However, 
it a ppears t hat a llegations of  br eaches of  s ervice s tandards l aid dow n i n t he C harter a re, 
subject t o a  c omplaint b y a n a ggrieved t axpayer ha ving be en r egistered w ith S ARS, 
investigated by the Service Monitoring Office.  
.  
                                                          
309S5 of PAJA. Rule 3(1) (a) promulgated under s 107A of the ITA. 
3101999 (2) SA 279 (T), 324. Min. of Environmental Affairs & Tourism & Others v Phambili Fisheries  
    (Pty) Ltd & Another 2003 (6) SA 407 (SCA), paras 40-41.  
3111989 (4) SA 731 (A).  
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313Croome, 286. 
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It is instructive in this chapter to reflect on the problem questions raised at the outset of this 
study t o de termine w hether or  not  t hey h ave be en c omprehensively addressed. T he m ain 
objective of the study was to determine whether the rule strikes a ba lance between SARS’s 
paramount duty and the taxpayers’ constitutional rights. 
The study reveals that the Constitution confers rights and remedies to taxpayers vis-à-vis the 
rule. The study further reveals that the Constitution confers wide powers to the Commissioner 
pursuant to the latter’s tax collection and administration mandate on which the sustenance of 
the South African government, being a constitutional state, depends. 
There i s ove rwhelming e vidence a s t he s tudy r eveals, t hat t he “ pay now , argue l ater” r ule 
does not  vi tiate t axpayers’ r ights. T hat t he “ pay now, a rgue l ater r ule ob tains i n ope n a nd 
democratic s ocieties an d that t he f iscal s tatutes f rom which it i s d erived have general 
application, is justification for the rule.  
However, stringent but valid criticisms notably by Keulder, Williams, Rood and Olivier have 
been levelled against Metcash and by extension, to the “pay now, argue later” rule.  
The s tudy al so reveals that t he pr ospects of  s uccess f or a t axpayer t hat cha llenges t he 
constitutionality of  a f iscal s tatute pr imarily w ithin the c ontext of  the  r ule a re a kin to 
searching for a needle in a haystack. 
Taxpayers w hose r ights ha ve b een m aterially and adversely affected by t he a ctions or  
omissions of  t he Commissioner a re at l iberty to institute an action against SARS based on 
breach of the rules of administrative justice. It is submitted that their prospects of success in 
respect of such action are, depending on the facts, relatively good. 
Entrenched i n t he C onstitution a nd P AJA a re provisions tha t c urtail the  C ommissioner’s 
powers to administer and collect taxes. However, where it is in the interest of the public and 
in a ddition t hereto, S ARS’s t ax a dministration a nd c ollection m andate w ould be  
compromised if the rules of natural justice are observed, the court sanctions SARS’ actions 
notwithstanding the prejudice suffered by a taxpayer.  
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The pr imary pu rpose of  P AJA i s not  onl y t o e nsure f air a dministrative a ction but  a lso t o 
control the exercise of public power by organs of state.  
In the final analysis, the study further reveals that the rule does not - albeit that a conc erted 
effort w as m ade t hrough l egislative i ntervention - strike a ba lance be tween SARS’s 
paramount duty and the taxpayers’ constitutional rights. 
The one  a nd onl y effective r emedy a t the  di sposal of  ta xpayers is  the  c ostly a nd time 
consuming litigation route – which many destitute taxpayers cannot afford.  
Given t he f act t hat M etcash w as de cided w ithin t he V AT A ct c ontext a nd not  w ithin t he 
context of the ITA, it is submitted that there is room for further research and speculation on 
what t he C C’s’ de cision w ould be  w hen called upon t o m ake a  de termination o n t he r ule 
within the income tax context.   
Sadly, until such decision is made, taxpayers have to come to terms with reality - that being, 
the “pay now, argue later rule” is here to stay and seemingly for a long period!     
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that a more cost-effective remedy for taxpayers such as the establishment 
of the Hugh Corder - type of administrative tr ibunals with restricted rights of  appeal to the 
courts or  t he i ntroduction a nd a doption of  t he A ustralian ‘ merits r eview’ s ystem w hich 
according to Croome would enhance the quality of  administrative decisions made in South 
Africa – should be considered.  
It i s r ecommended t hat S ARS S ervice C harter s hould be  r egularly r eviewed a nd where 
necessary updated to take account of developments in the tax arena.  
The applicable Charter was introduced by SARS in 2005. It is submitted that it is dated and 
should be reviewed as a matter of urgency to bring it in line with the developments in the tax 
arena.      
The P ublic P rotector a nd t he H uman R ights C ommission a nd not  S ARS, s hould pl ay a 
pivotal r ole of  he ightening t axpayers’ awareness t o the f iscal r elated services t hat s uch 
institutions render to the public through pamphleteering, print and electronic media and also 
by providing training to staff in order to equip them with the skills and expertise necessary to 
address tax complaints.  
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Fear of  r etribution b y SARS i s t he unde rlying r eason be hind t axpayers’ r eluctance t o 
complain about SARS. It is recommended that mechanisms should be devised on the basis of 
which taxpayers can lodge complaints against SARS on a confidential basis. A criteria that 
such complaints must satisfy should be set and be published to circumvent the flooding of the 
system w ith frivolous a nd ve xatious c omplaints. C onsequently, t he onl y complaints t o b e 
entertained should be those that meet the criteria.      
The creation and enhancement of pressure groups such as taxpayers’ association (where they 
do not exist) which play a significant role in improving the protection of taxpayers’ rights, is 
recommended.                                                                              
It is further recommended that the SMO should be detached from SARS in order to enhance 
its e ffectiveness i n r elation t o a ddressing t axpayers’ s ubstandard performance-related 
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